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The story of agricultural policy in Northeast Asia over the past 50 years illustrates the dramatic 
changes that can occur in distortions to agricultural incentives faced by producers and consumers 
at different stages of economic development. In this study of Japan, the Republic of Korea (the 
southern part of the peninsula, hereafter referred to as Korea) and the island of Taiwan, China 
(hereafter referred to as Taiwan), we estimate the degree of distortions for key agricultural 
products as well as for the agricultural sector as a whole over a period when these economies 
transitioned from low- or middle- to high-income status (1955 to 2004 plus, in the case of Japan, 
its experience pre- World War II) – the beginning of the so-called East Asian economic miracle 
of dramatic industrial development.   
  Theodore Schultz (1978) established that as economies advance from low- to 
high-income status, agricultural policies tend to change from taxing to subsidizing agriculture, 
and Japan, Korea and Taiwan are clear examples. We compare the policy evolution in these 
economies and provide information on the effect of policies and underlying economic conditions 
on changes in agricultural distortions. Our findings shed lights on how agricultural distortions 
may change over different stages of economic development in later-developing countries.  
To begin, we give a succinct summary of core characteristics of the three economies in 
terms of the nature of their economies, including their resource endowments that determined the 
course of their modern economic growth and development. The evolution of agricultural policies 
in the three economies is then reviewed before discussing how to measure distortions to 
agricultural incentives using the methodology from Anderson et al. (2008), the focus of which is 
on nominal and relative rates of assistance (NRAs and RRAs). Implications of our empirical 
findings for policy reforms in the three economies are discussed in the final section, where we 
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also identify lessons for later-developing economies experiencing similar structural 
transformations in the course of their economic growth. 
We find that significant agricultural protection growth began when these economies 
entered the middle-income stage of economic development. We identify the mechanisms 
underlying the growth of agricultural protection. Statistical observations are found to be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the success of rapid industrialization that advanced these 
economies to the middle-income stage resulted in declines in agriculture‘s comparative 
advantage associated with the growing income disparity between farmers and employees in 
non-agricultural sectors. The demand from farmers for a reduction of farm-nonfarm income 
disparity materialized in the form of increased assistance to agriculture. This was manifest 
predominantly through rapid and sustained growth in border protection of agricultural products.   
 
 
Economic development and structural change  
 
 
The choice of agricultural policies, particularly price-distorting policies, is closely related to the 
process of economic development. As identified by Schultz (1978), there are two agricultural 
problems — ―the food problem‖— that underlie policies commonly adopted in low-income 
countries that exploit or tax agriculture. These policies contrast to the policies that protect or 
subsidize agriculture in many high-income countries seeking to solve ―the farm problem‖. 
Schultz‘ hypothesis became an established paradigm among agricultural economists, finding 
support in several empirical studies (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Hayami 1988; Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdes 1991). More recently, Hayami (2005) and Hayami and Godo (2004) have added ―the 
disparity problem‖ as specific to middle-income economies. They suggest it is important to see 
how distortions in agricultural incentives change in all three types of economies over their 
different stages of development.  
The most distinguishing characteristic of Japan, Korea and Taiwan during the period we 
study is their unusually rapid rates of economic growth and industrial development. In describing 
the so-called East Asian Miracle, the World Bank (1993) depicted Japan as the front runner, and  
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Korea and Taiwan, together with Hong Kong and Singapore, as the second group.
2  The ASEAN 
nations and China are following behind with rapid rates of economic growth. Since the changing 
nature of distortions of agricultural incentives seems to be closely related to the rate of economic 
growth and structural change, we provide an overview of the development of the three economies 
and associated changes in economic and agricultural structures. 
 
Initial conditions and development strategies 
 
Northeast Asia is characterized by regular monsoon rain, together with mountainous, undulated 
topography in which irrigation water could be controlled relatively easily with efforts at the 
family and community levels. This makes the region well suited to rice production by small 
family farms, commonly called ―peasants‖, who were organized into village communities. The 
agrarian structure — established before the modern era — involved smallholder farms on an 
average of about one hectare, predominantly dependent on rice cultivation. It is important to 
recognize that, unlike Southeast Asia, large agribusiness plantations based on hired labor were 
almost completely absent not only in Japan and Korea, located in the temperate zone, but also in 
Taiwan where tropical cash crops such as sugar and banana comprised a significant share of 
agriculture. The rural community was traditionally stratified across landlords, land-owning 
cultivators and landless tenants prior to the land reforms after the Second World War, but 
agricultural laborers subsisting on hired labor wages were not a significant component of the 
rural population. 
There is a high degree of similarity in the agrarian structures of Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, due in part to the fact that Japan brought its institutions to its colonies — Taiwan since 
1895 and Korea since 1910. The most fundamental institution was fee simple titles granted to 
land owners through cadastral surveys, in return for their payment of land tax. Japanese efforts to 
develop the colonies concentrated on agriculture, and especially on rice after Japan experienced a 
shortage of supply relative to demand after the so-called Rice Riot in 1918. The promotion of rice 
production through agricultural research and extension systems, and irrigation and drainage 
infrastructure, plus protection from rice imports from the rest of the world (see Anderson and 
                                                 
2 On the dramatic transformation of Korea and Taiwan from slow inward-looking economic growth to rapiur  
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Tyers 1992), was considered a major success from Japan‘s viewpoint in that its rice imports from 
the two colonies increased from 5 to 20 percent of consumption in Japan between 1915 and 1935. 
The increased export of rice and other primary commodities and the corresponding 
inflow of manufactured commodities meant dependency of the Korean and Taiwanese economies 
on agriculture remained high. This tendency was especially pronounced in the southern part of 
Korea, because Japanese industrial development efforts on the Korean peninsula were 
concentrated in the north: hydroelectric power of the Yalu River fed a complex of chemical 
industries there that was larger than existed in Japan in those days. The heavy dependency on 
agriculture in the south was furthered by urban destruction during the Korean War (1950-53). 
Relative to (South) Korea, commerce and industry were more active in Taiwan. This 
was because the larger cash-crop sector there required larger amounts of processing and 
marketing activities relative to subsistence crops such as rice and barley. The Taiwan situation 
under colonial rule was somewhat akin to Japan from the mid-19th to the early 20th century. The 
commercial treaties imposed by Western powers in the mid-19
th century deprived Japan of tariff 
autonomy. Japan consequently specialized in labor-intensive manufactures based on 
farm-supplied materials such as silk reeling, tea processing, and cotton weaving. This accorded 
with comparative advantage under virtual free trade. This led to a wide dispersion of small and 
medium industries in rural areas in Japan. This small-scale industry in Japan and Taiwan 
contrasts with the concentration of Korean industry in large-scale establishments in urban areas. 
  This is not the place to discuss why Japan, Korea and Taiwan were able to achieve 
remarkable success in economic development as the forerunners in the East Asian Miracle.
3   
Here it suffices to note that the success of these economies was due to successful borrowing of 
technology from advanced economies. Gerschenkron (1962) suggests that the later is the start of 
industrialization in an economy, the larger is the scope for economic growth through technology 
borrowing from earlier starters. The question still remains, however, as to why Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan in particular were successful in technology borrowing among the many late starters. 
One reason is the endowments of cheap but relatively well educated labor in these 
resource-poor economies. This made initial borrowing of labor-intensive technologies more 
efficient, and the later switching to capital/knowledge-intensive technologies smoother. Another 
                                                                                                                                                              
export-led economic growth, see for example Mason et al. (1980) and Tsiang (1980).  
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reason is the great crises faced by these economies: Japan‘s defeat in the Second World War, 
South Korea‘s military confrontation with the North, Taiwan‘s loss of the Mainland to the 
communists. Those crises compelled their leaders to adopt policies to achieve economic success 
for the sake of maintaining their legitimacy, instead of indulging in rent-seeking activities 
(Hayami and Godo 2005, pp. 275-6). 
  Despite much similarity, there were also significant differences in the industrialization 
strategy adopted by the three economies, especially as between Korea and Taiwan. In Japan, 
although policies were aimed at promoting the development of capital-intensive industries after 
the recovery of tariff autonomy in 1911, small/medium industries continued to survive as a major 
component of the industrial sector, and many of them located in rural areas. In Taiwan, although 
the Nationalist Party tightly controlled formal sectors, there was little government intervention in 
the activities of small/medium entrepreneurs, who were able to grow through various marketing 
and financial linkages among themselves and with foreign firms. They became very 
internationally competitive (Ho 1979, 1982). In contrast, government control in Korea was 
stronger and more complete, especially under the military administration of Pak Chong-hui 
(1961-79). All formal credits were channeled from nationalized banks to large industry, while 
foreign direct investment was tightly controlled (Cole and Park 1983, Amsdae 1989). This 
strategy underlay the high concentration of industrial production in a small number of large 
enterprises in Korea. 
   
Economic growth and structural transformation 
 
We now turn to a quantitative summary of economic development in Japan, Korea and Taiwan in 
the past five decades. Table 1 shows some indicators of economic development. The first three 
rows indicate real GDP per capita in 2000 constant prices at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2006). In 1955, Japan‘s GDP 
per capita was more than $3,000, whereas Korea and Taiwan‘s was less than $1,500. Japan 
experienced economic growth thereafter, reaching $4,500 in 1960 and $5,000 in 1961. In 1960 
Korea and Taiwan had per capita GDP averages of around $1,500, but they had achieved per 
capita GDPs of $5,000 by 1978 in Taiwan and 1983 in Korea. Japan reached a level of per capita 
                                                                                                                                                              
3 For our perspective on such a question, see Hayami (2005, Section 8.4) and Aoki and Hayami (1998).  
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GDP beyond $10,000 by 1970, and Taiwan and Korea reached that level by 1988 and 1991, 
respectively. Roughly speaking, in terms of the growth of per-capita GDP, Japan was ahead of 
Taiwan by about two decades and Taiwan was ahead of Korea by about half a decade; although 
these margins decreased over time. 
It is convenient to classify the development of the economies into four stages of economic 
development as follows: 
  Low-income stage ($1,500 or less): 1950 for Japan and before 1960 for Korea and 
Taiwan; 
  Lower middle-income stage ($1,500-$5,000): 1950-60 for Japan and 1960-80 for Korea 
and Taiwan;  
  Upper middle-income stage ($5,000-$10,000): 1960-70 for Japan and 1980-90 for Korea 
and Taiwan; and  
  High-income stage ($10,000 or more): after 1970 for Japan and after 1990 for Korea and 
Taiwan.  
The criteria of classification are not universal but are convenient for the comparison of the 
economic development in these three economies.
4 
Changes in other indicators in Table 1 are closely related with changes in per capita real 
GDP over the four stages. The GDP share of agriculture in Japan in 1955— the lower 
middle-income stage — was 17 percent, which was much smaller than the shares in the 
low-income stage for Korea and Taiwan, of 47 and 29 percent, respectively. By 1970 in Taiwan 
and 1980 in Korea, the shares had declined to similar levels to that of Japan at the lower 
middle-income stage — 15 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Bt the time Japan entered the 
high-income stage in 1970, the agricultural share of GDP had declined to 4 percent, which was 
about the same as that of Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s when they entered the high-income 
stage. 
Although Korea and Taiwan experienced similar changes in per capita real GDP over the 
four stages, significant differences can be observed in their economic structures. The GDP share 
of agriculture in 1955 in Korea was nearly 50 percent whereas that of Taiwan was below 30 
                                                 
4 In terms of real GDP per capita in 2000 constant prices, for example, China exceeded $1,500 in 1990 and $5,000 in 
2004 whereas Thailand passed $1,500 level in 1968 and $5,000 level in 1991. For high-income stage, the United  
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percent, and similar differences can be observed with respect to agriculture‘s share of labor force 
which was as high as 80 percent in Korea versus less than 55 percent in Taiwan. This reflects 
Korea‘s higher dependency on agriculture. In both countries, the share of agriculture in GDP 
declined significantly over time — to 3.8 percent in Korea and 1.7 percent in Taiwan by 2004 — 
although Korea‘s share remained at nearly double Taiwan‘s. 
Historical differences can be observed in agriculture‘s shares of the labor force in Korea 
and Taiwan. Interestingly, however, the difference in the labor force share of agriculture 
disappeared by 2004 with about 7.7 percent of Korean employment in agriculture versus 7.5 
percent in Taiwan. The relatively faster declines in the labor force share of agriculture in GDP in 
Korea reflect its high urban concentration of industries. In Taiwan, characterized by the wide 
dispersion of industries over rural areas, farmers increased their incomes from off-farm 
employment while continued to be classified as farmers. In contrast, far more rural people in 
Korea had to quit farming and migrate to urban areas to obtain non-farm employment. These 
differences are reflected in the much faster decreases in the share of farm household population in 
total population in Korea relative to Taiwan and Japan.   
The last rows in Table 1 report the ratios of agricultural GDP per worker to the total GDP 
per worker. This can be considered an indicator of the relative labor productivity of agriculture to 
the total labor productivity of the whole economy. It may also be regarded as an indicator of the 
income gap between the agricultural sector and the whole economy. The relative labor 
productivity of agriculture in nominal terms was not very different among the three economies in 
1955. But in Japan it declined sharply, from 52 percent in 1955 to nearly 25 percent in 1970 and 
thereafter. It was not until 1960 that this ratio began to decline in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea it 
reached 44 percent in 1980 (from 65 percent in 1960) and stayed nearly constant thereafter. In 
Taiwan, the ratio continued to decline to 23 percent in 2000. That is lower than that of Japan, 
reflecting the extraordinary abundance of non-farm employment opportunities for farmers in 
Taiwan.  
These measures should be interpreted with great care, however. Faster declines in this 
ratio in Taiwan relative to Korea appear to indicate faster growth in agricultural labor 
productivity in Korea. In fact, however, the declining ratio is due to faster decreases in the 
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Korean farm labor force owing to faster out-migration of farm labor to urban occupations in 
Korea relative to Taiwan. Thus, growth in the labor productivity of farmers engaging in 
agricultural activities relative to that of other workers would not have been slower and could have 
been even faster in Taiwan if the ratio was calculated using output per hour of labor instead of 
output per worker according to the official sectoral labor force classification.   
 
Changes in the structure of agriculture 
 
How did the structure of agriculture in Japan, Korea and Taiwan change in the course of their 
economic development? In Japan as of 2004, 2.9 million farm households accounted for 2.6 
million workers engaged mainly in agricultural activities. Because the number of workers 
engaged mainly in agriculture is less than the number of farm households, some farm households 
have no worker engaged mainly in agriculture. Japan‘s Agricultural Census defines a farm 
household as the one that operates 0.1 hectare or more of farmland, or annual sales of agricultural 
products of 150,000 yen (US$1,250 for the exchange rate of 120 yen/$) or more. Thus, very 
small units of farm operation, in which no full-time worker engages in farm production, are 
classified as farm households. Indeed, full-time farm households having no family member 
engaged in non-agricultural employment accounted for 15 percent of total farm households in 
2004. On the other hand, non-commercial farm households, which operate less than 30 ares of 
farmland or have annual sales of less than 500,000 yen, accounted for 26 percent of total farm 
households. Moreover, part-time farm households whose income from non-agricultural sources 
exceeds agricultural income accounted for a half of total farm households.  
The number of agricultural workers in Japan declined from 14 million in 1955 to 
2.6 million in 2004, but the number of farm households declined only from 6.0 million in 1955 to 
2.9 million in 2004. Slow decreases in the number of farm households, together with decreases in 
agricultural land(from 6.1 to 4.7 million hectares between 1955 and 2004), resulted in a very 
small increase in arable land per farm from 1.01 hectare in 1955 to 1.61 hectares in 2004 (Table 
2). The average area of agricultural land per farm in Japan is very small by global standards. 
Europe‘s are 20 to 45 times larger, and those of the United States are 125 times larger. The slow 
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growth of small-sized operation has been a key constraint on the growth of agricultural 
productivity, resulting in continual declines in the comparative advantage of Japanese agriculture, 
particularly of land-intensive activities, in the course of rapid industrial development. 
Table 2 shows that in 2004, 2.9 million farm households in Japan held 9.4 million people 
with the average family size being 3.2 persons. In the same year, 1.2 million farm households in 
Korea held 3.4 million people and 1.8 million hectares of arable land with the average family and 
farm sizes being 2.8 persons and 1.5 hectares, respectively. In Taiwan, 0.72 million farm 
households held 3.2 million people and 0.84 million hectares of arable land with the average 
family and farm sizes being 4.5 persons and 1.2 hectares, respectively. It is notable that the 
number of people in farm households in Korea declined at a much faster rate than in Japan and 
Taiwan, which was the result of faster decreases in both the number of farm households and the 
number of persons per household in the former than the latter. These observations reflect the 
scarcity of non-farm employment opportunities in Korea‘s rural areas, due to its urban-centered 
industrialization. Indeed, from 1970 to 2004 the share of agricultural income in the total income 
of farm households declined from 32 to 14 percent in Japan and 49 to 22 percent in Taiwan, 
whereas in Korea it was as high as 76 percent in 1970 and was still 39 percent in 2004. 
Japan has lost 23 percent of its arable land area over the past 50 years, falling from 6.1 
million hectares in 1955 to 4.7 million hectares in 2004. Thus decreases in arable land under 
cultivation were a significant contributor to changes in farm size in Japan in terms of arable land 
per farm household. Meanwhile, the arable land area in Korea deceased from 2 million hectares 
in 1955 to 1.8 million hectares in 2004, and arable land in Taiwan remained almost constant 
(0.87 million hectares in 1955 and 0.84 million hectares in 2004). Farm-size changes in Korea 
and Taiwan were almost exclusively the result of changes in the number of farm households. In 
Japan and Korea, average farm sizes increased slowly from 1.0 and 0.9 hectares in 1955 to 1.6 
and 1.5 hectares in 2004, respectively, whereas the farm size in Taiwan remained almost constant 
during this period. The faster increase in farm size in Korea, relative to Taiwan, was the result 
again of faster out-migration of farm workers and their families to urban areas owing to more 
urban-centered industrialization in Korea. 
The distinct characteristic of industrialization in Korea is clearly reflected in its high share 
of agricultural income in total farm household income. In all three economies, this ratio 
decreased as off-farm employment for the members of farm households increased. In Japan, the  
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ratio decreased from 70 percent in 1955 to 32 percent in 1970 and further to 14 percent in 2004, 
corresponding to the shift from the lower middle-income to upper middle-income stage of 
development and then to the high-income stage. In Taiwan this ratio was already below 50 
percent in 1970 when its economy was in the lower middle-income stage, and it went down to 22 
percent in 2004. In contrast, in Korea the ratio was 76 percent in 1970 and it was still nearly 40 
percent in 2004, which is not only higher than in Taiwan but is also higher than in Japan at 
comparable development stages. 
Major differences in the adjustments of agriculture to economic growth based on 
industrial development are also reflected in changes in the commodity mix of farm production. 
Rice was traditionally the most important crop in all three economies, but its importance declined 
as per capita income increased. However, changes in its relative importance were different. From 
1960 to 2004, the share of rice in the total value of agricultural production in Japan declined from 
47 to 23 percent and in Korea from 59 to 28 percent. In contrast, the share of rice in Taiwan was 
originally lower at 37 percent in 1960 and it decreased rapidly to as low as 7 percent by 2004. 
Such a contrast reflects the fact that Taiwan‘s agriculture traditionally depended less on rice 
because of its greater opportunity to grow cash crops and, also, its success in achieving greater 
agricultural diversification toward high-valued commodities such as vegetables, fruits, poultry 
and pigmeat more efficiently than Japan and Korea in response to the shift in domestic demand 
for more income-elastic commodities. 
 
 
Evolution of agricultural policy  
 
 






                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on Hayami (1988).  
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Before the mid-1950s Japan tried hard to recover from the devastation of the Second World War. 
The primary emphasis of agricultural policy was on increasing domestic food production and 
delivering food equitably at low costs to consumers. To this end, the government invested heavily 
in agricultural research, extension and land infrastructure and, at the same time, placed rigid 
controls on rice procurement from farmers and delivery to consumers under the Food Control 
Laws enacted during the War.  
Right after the Second World War, land reform was carried out in accordance with the 
strong recommendations of the occupying authorities. The urgent need to increase agricultural 
production through increased production incentives to cultivators was sufficiently strong to 
overcome the opposition of landlords against strengthening of the rights of tenants through 
government control of rents and land prices. During the four years from 1947 to 1950, the 
government purchased 1.7 million hectares of farmland from landlords and transferred 1.9 
million hectares, including state-owned land, to tenant farmers, which amounted to about 80 
percent of the land under tenancy before the land reform. 
Although land reform resulted in a considerable change in the distribution of land 
ownership, the size distribution of operational holdings experienced no basic changes. As a result 
the traditional agrarian structure of Japan, characterized by small-scale family farms with an 
average size of about l hectare, remained despite the rise and the fall of landlordism (Table 2). 
There is no doubt that the land reform promoted more equal asset and income distribution among 
farmers, and hence contributed to social stability in Japan‘s rural sector. However, land reform 
did not induce changes in the basic direction of technological developments, because small-scale 
family farms continued to be the basic unit of agricultural production. Land reform contributed to 
an increase in standards of living and consumption levels, but its contributions to capital 
formation and productivity growth in agriculture were not significant (Kawano 1969). 
As Japan set off on its ‗miraculous‘ economic growth in the mid-1950s, agriculture began 
to face serious adjustment problems. The rate of growth in agricultural productivity, which was 
rapid by international standards, was not rapid enough to keep up with growth in the industrial 
sector. The intersectoral terms of trade did not improve for agriculture during the 1950s after the 
end of the Korean War. This was partly because of the pressure of surplus agricultural 
commodities in the United States and other exporting countries, and partly because the domestic 
demand for major staple cereals (especially rice) approached saturation after the bumper crop of  
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1955. As a consequence, incomes and living standards of farm households lagged behind those of 
urban households during the 1950s.. 
In 1961 real GDP per capita in Japan exceeded $5,000, which meant Japan entered the 
upper middle-income stage of economic development. Correspondingly, the major goal of 
agricultural policy shifted from increased production of food staples to reducing the rural-urban 
income gap. The need to assist farmers increased in the 1960s, as the rural-urban income gap 
progressively widened and the out-migration of agricultural labor accelerated. The difficulty of 
structural adjustment in agriculture as a result of the rapidly growing economy led to the 
enactment in 1961 of the Agricultural Basic Law, a national charter for agriculture. This Law 
declared that it was the government‘s responsibility to raise agricultural productivity and thereby 
to close the gap in income and welfare between farm and non-farm people. 
In order to raise agricultural productivity and to improve farming efficiency, it was 
considered essential to increase the scale of farm operation by eliminating inefficient farm units 
and by promoting cooperative operations among remaining farms. Despite such efforts at 
structural adjustment, the rate of agricultural productivity growth was not increased sufficiently 
to prevent the rural-urban income gap from widening further. In such a situation the Food Control 
System, which was originally designed to provide food security to consumers, became the major 
instrument to protect farmers. Under the Food Control System, based on the Food Control Law of 
1942, most food items were placed under direct government control. However, as the Japanese 
economy recovered from the war, the number of items under control was reduced so that rice 
alone remained under direct control after 1952. Rice was directly controlled in its distribution. 
Initially, the whole marketing process of rice from producers to consumers was under direct 
control of the Food Agency and prices were regulated from the farm-gate to the retail level, 
although the regulations were gradually relaxed. 
After Japan entered the upper middle-income stage in the 1960s, the Food Control System 
became a powerful instrument for rice farmers, and they organized political lobbying to raise rice 
prices for government purchases. Their pressure resulted in a rice price determination formula in 
1960 called the ‗Production Cost and Income Compensation Formula‘ under the Food Control 
System. This formula was designed to reduce the gap between farm and non-farm income and 
wages by raising rice prices. This goal appears to have been achieved: income per agricultural 
worker compared to income per worker in manufacturing improved after 1960 following a rapid  
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rise in agricultural relative to manufacturing prices. The increase in the price of rice, which 
constituted about 40 percent of the total value of agricultural output before 1970, was a major 
factor in improving the domestic terms of trade for agriculture. The rise in agricultural prices, 
together with increases in off-farm income, resulted in a marked reduction in the income per 
capita gap between agricultural and non-agricultural households. 
Protecting rice farmers through a price policy was possible in Japan because rice trade 
was completely controlled by the state-trading system. During the 1960s the price of rice was 
raised not only far above the world price but also above the market equilibrium price under 
autarky. At the upper middle-income stage, Japan was able to let consumers and taxpayers 
shoulder the costs of agricultural protection. 
However, there was a limit on increasing agricultural protection through price policy. The 
high protected prices of rice resulted in an expansion of rice production in excess of 
consumption. The accumulated surplus of rice in government storage forced the government to 
introduce controls on rice acreage in 1969, which are still in place today. Further, the dramatic 
increase in income and wages of industrial workers after 1960 meant their diet changed. Average 
consumption per industrial employee (deflated by the consumer price index) doubled in the 
1955-70 period, and again in the following decade and half. Correspondingly, rice was no longer 
a major wage good for industrial workers. To cope with the increasing rice surplus, the Food 
Control System was revised. The direct control on rice distribution was relaxed by introducing 
non-government distribution channels. Finally in 1995 the Food Control Law was replaced by the 
Staple Food Law, whereby the role of government was limited to stock holding operations for 
food security, although state-trading of rice is maintained for international trade. 
Real GDP per capita in Japan exceeded $10,000 after 1969. As the economy advanced to 
the high-income stage, demand for agricultural protection from the farm bloc increased. Japan‘s 
comparative advantage continued to shift away from agriculture to industry, while internal 
resistance to protectionism declined because the non-farm population became affluent and, hence, 
less resistant to shouldering the cost of agricultural protection in the form of high food prices or 
subsidies to farm producers. However, while internal resistance weakened, external pressures for 
liberalization of agricultural imports increased. 
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Japan had to adjust agricultural 
policies to be more consistent with the globalization of the economy. Following the agreement, in  
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1995 Japan converted non-tariff border measures to tariffs for 28 commodities. At the beginning 
of implementation, rice was exempted from tariffication in compensation of larger minimum 
access imports of rice, namely 4 percent of domestic consumption in 1995, rising to 8 percent by 
2000. However, Japan adopted tarriffication for rice in 1999, so the minimum access imports 
remained at 7.2 percent of domestic consumption.  
Becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 forced the 
government to reform domestic agricultural policy. In 1999 the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture 
and Rural Areas was enacted as a replacement for the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law. Four years 
earlier the Food Control Law was abolished in 1995 to liberalize the domestic rice market. The 
1999 Basic Law obliged the government to draft a Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural 
Areas for the promotion of the comprehensive and systematic implementation of policies on 
food, agriculture and rural areas. The plan is supposed to be redrafted every five years. Under the 
current Basic Plan, made in 2005, a key point of the new agricultural policy is to target 
government assistance to farmers who satisfy certain conditions, especially on minimum farm 
size. That is, it compels farmers who want to continue farming under government assistance to 





Before 1960 Korea was a low-income country, with per-capita income below $1500. Its economy 
was left severely damaged by the Korean War. The agricultural policy adopted in this stage 
aimed to maintain low domestic consumer prices for staple foods, notably rice and barley, as well 
as for fertilizer. The Grain Management Law, enacted in 1950, gave the government the authority 
to regulate the price of staple foods. However, government control was not very effective during 
the 1950s since the market share of government-controlled rice was less than 10 percent. The 
government was supposed to purchase grain directly from farmers, but they were unable to 
purchase sufficient amounts due to budgetary constraints and upward spiraling grain prices due to 
inflation in the mid-1950s. Schemes to collect rice as land tax in kind and to barter fertilizer for 
rice were initiated. The former was successful but the latter was not because the implicit price of 
                                                 
6 This section draws heavily on Moon and Kang (1989).  
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rice in the barter was lower than the market price. Grain imports from the United States under 
Public Law 480, which amounted to 8 to 12 percent of total domestic grain during 1956-65, 
helped the Korean government to keep grain prices low.  
In the 1960s, Korea began to launch in a massive way the policies of promoting 
industrialization under the development autocracy of Pak Chong-hui. Agricultural policies at this 
time were designed to keep the price of staple food crops low so as to maintain low costs of 
living and wage rates for industrial workers, rather than maintaining adequate incomes for 
farmers. The government purchase prices were below market prices, which were considered 
necessary for the purpose of increasing industrial profits and capital formation. Over time, the 
Korean government‘s price intervention became more intense. The market share of 
government-controlled rice was expanded to 20-25 percent during the 1960s, which was used 
mainly for maintaining low domestic prices. These agricultural-taxing policies continued in the 
beginning of the lower middle-income stage. 
As Korea‘s economy quickly advanced toward the upper middle-income stage, the 
direction of agricultural policy gradually moved toward supporting farmers. In the early 1970s, 
the buffer-stock operation for non-cereal products was set in motion for counteracting their price 
declines. In addition to chemical fertilizers, pesticides and farm machineries were added to the 
list of subsidized inputs (alleviating the adverse impact on farmers of import protection to 
manufacturers of those inputs). The government‘s purchase prices for rice and barley were 
steadily raised with the aim of increasing food production as well as reducing the urban-rural 
income gap. Although the government raised the producer prices for staple food grains, it did so 
without a comparable rise in the market prices of rice and barley in order to prevent the cost of 
living and the wage rate of industrial workers from rising. Likewise, it assisted livestock 
producers in part by using import quotas rather than tariffs to protect them from import 
competition, with the rent from those quotas being captured by the producer-managed meat 
import agency.
7  
The implementation of the two-price system, however, conflicted with the need to 
maintain financial and monetary stability. As the difference between the purchase and sale prices 
                                                 
7 This drove a small wedge between the nominal rate of assistance for producers and the consumer tax equivalent for 
beef (Anderson 1986). This was very similar to the scheme operating in Japan in the 1970s. On why the government  
 
16 
of rice and barley widened, the deficit of the grain management fund increased. Since a large 
portion of this deficit was financed by long-term overdrafts from the Bank of Korea, this policy 
became a major addition to inflationary pressure. Expansion of the government deficit due to the 
two-price policy became a serious constraint on the policy.  
Upon entering the upper middle-income stage in the 1980s, the Korean government took a 
step toward reducing both tariff and non-tariff protection for manufacturing industries. In 
contrast, agricultural policies toward protecting farmers were strengthened. The producer prices 
of farm products were increased to levels far above border prices by means of quantitative import 
restrictions on most agricultural commodities.  
After Korea entered the high-income stage in the early 1990s, significant policy changes 
in were mostly related to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) stipulated in 
1995. According to the provisions of the URAA, all of Korea‘s quantitative restrictions were 
converted to tariffs for all agricultural products except rice. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
Korea retained the status of a developing country, which gave it special treatment in 
implementing commitments to reduce border protection. The agricultural products under 
tariffication were subject to a protection reduction commitment of 24 percent on average within 
ten years, with the minimum cut of 10 percent. Tariff rates of Korean agricultural products were 
over 60 percent on average. Tariffs on products which were considered particularly important in 
Korea were cut by the minimum rate of 10 percent. 
In addition, imports of many agricultural products began under the minimum market 
access commitment. This commitment required that for all agricultural products, at least 
3 percent of consumption must be purchased from overseas in the first year and the import share 
must increase annually up to 5 percent of consumption within ten years. Low tariff rates were 
applied to the in-quota volume so as to guarantee easy market access from exporting countries. 
Many key agricultural products such as rice, barley, orange, red pepper, garlic, and onion began 
to be newly imported under this commitment. 
Rice, the most important item for Korean agriculture, was temporarily exempted from 
tariffication as provided in Annex 5.B of the URAA. As an exception, rice was subject to an 
import quota, beginning with 1 percent of total consumption and gradually increasing up to 4 
                                                                                                                                                              
chose that scheme rather than a more efficient equally-protective tariff plus a consumer subsidy funded by the tariff  
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percent in 2004, the final implementation year. If Korean rice had not been exempted from 
tariffication, Korea would have complied with the standard market access commitment of from 3 
percent to 5 percent. The temporary exemption from tariffication expired in 2004, but Korea 





After World War II Taiwan suffered from high inflation rates, serious shortages of food and other 
necessities, and a heavy defense burden. The government gave the highest priority to economic 
stabilization, food production increases, and the repair of war damages. To alleviate the intense 
population pressure on limited land, it decided to grant incentives to farmers. Together with the 
land reform program implemented between 1949 and 1953, war-damaged irrigation and drainage 
facilities were repaired, fertilizers and other farm inputs were made available, and farmers‘ 
organizations were strengthened. 
In the recovery stage of the Taiwan economy the Sino-American Joint Commission on 
Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), established in Nanking in 1948, played an important role. JCRR 
served as a non-permanent agency for the postwar rural reconstruction of China. From 1951 to 
1965 the United States provided a total of $1.5 billion in aid. Approximately one-third went to 
agriculture, which was used to build infrastructure and foster human resources for agriculture. 
Also, substantial imports of U.S. aid-financed commodities and increases in domestic production, 
especially of food, helped relieve demand pressures. 
In the low-income stage of economic development (before 1960), agricultural policy in 
Taiwan was designed mainly to supply rice at low stable prices to non-farm population. In those 
days two important taxes were imposed on farmers: the farm land tax and the hidden rice tax. 
This was done by means of compulsory rice purchases and the rice-fertilizer barter system. The 
compulsory purchase of paddy from landowners at official prices was another source of 
government-control over rice. All the paddy lands were subject to the paddy land tax plus the 
compulsory procurement of rice. The compulsory procurement was assessed on the basis of tax 
units determined by land productivity. The difference between the government procurement 
                                                                                                                                                              
revenue is discussed in Hayami (1979) and Anderson (1983b).  
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prices and farmers‘ market prices constituted a hidden tax on paddy landowners who were mostly 
farm operators after the implementation of land reform program. The hidden tax was gradually 
reduced as per-capita income rose, but it continued to exist until its abolition in 1973. 
The government‘s rice collection by all of these methods during 1950-70 averaged 50 to 
60 percent of the total amount of rice produced minus farmers‘ home consumption. By 1973, 
however, this share had declined to 20 percent. In subsequent years it increased again because of 
the implementation of the guaranteed rice price policy. The total of this hidden rice tax was larger 
than Taiwan‘s total income tax before1963 and was more than twice the farm land tax before 
1961, except in 1954. After 1961, when Taiwan moved to the lower middle-income stage, the 
hidden rice tax decreased rapidly: the ratio of the hidden rice tax to the total income tax was only 
8.5 percent in 1971 (Kuo 1975).  
Agricultural policy geared to exploit agriculture for the sake of supporting industrial 
development (and military development) largely ended during the 1970s, when the shift to 
subsidizing agriculture began. This was the period when Taiwan rapidly expanded its 
labor-intensive light industries in response to increases in export demand. Because many light 
industries such as garments and footwear were located in rural areas, non-farm incomes became 
increasingly more important to farm households. Taiwan farmers were able to take advantage of 
employment in manufacturing without leaving home and, also, many of them engaged in 
non-farm self-employed activities in less-busy farm seasons. Therefore, the need for farmers to 
rely on agricultural protection policies was smaller than in Korea.  
It was 1978 when Taiwan entered the upper middle-income stage with its real GDP per 
capita exceeding $5,000. Still, to help equalize the income level of farm workers with that of the 
rapidly expanding industrial sector, the government offered loans and subsidies for promoting 
farm mechanization, which were designed to raise farmers‘ labor productivity. At this time the 
growth of rice production began to slow down in response to an increased emphasis on livestock 
and fishery products and high-value export crops. Increases in industrial employment also were 
pushing up the costs of farm labor. Labor productivity in agriculture continued to lag behind that 
of the industrial sector, and the gap between farm and non-farm per capita incomes was 
increasing, especially for farmers who relied mainly on rice production. The problems faced by 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 This section draws heavily on Mao and Schive (1995).  
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Taiwan agriculture were similar to those that many other industrial countries experienced at a 
comparable development stage, especially Japan in the early 1960s and Korea in the late 1970s. 
In Taiwan, per-capita consumption of rice fell from 140 kilograms per year in 1968 to 
74 kilograms in 1988. Correspondingly, an accumulation of the rice stock became a serious 
problem. In order to reduce production, farm extension workers encouraged farmers to plant 
other crops in rice fields, but their efforts were not successful because no economic incentive was 
provided. A six-year rice-crop substitution plan was inaugurated in 1984 that gave direct 
subsidies of 1 metric ton of paddy rice per hectare to farmers who shifted their rice fields to corn 
or sorghum, or 1.5 metric tons of paddy rice per hectare to farmers who shifted to crops other 
than corn and sorghum. In addition, corn and sorghum were purchased by the government at 
guaranteed prices. Under the program, rice production declined to 1.84 million metric tons in 
1988, which was smaller by 0.9 million metric tons than the peak of 1976. The paid-in-kind 
subsidy was changed to a cash payment in 1988 to improve efficiency in the management of the 
program. 
Taiwan entered the high-income stage in the late 1980s with its real GDP per capita 
exceeding $10,000 from 1988. The most important changes in agricultural policy in Taiwan in 
the high-income stage were related to its accession to the WTO that became effective on 1 
January 2002. In line with the level of economic development, Taiwan agreed to bring its tariff 
rates to a level between those of Japan and Korea. Taiwan agreed to reduce its tariffs from the 
average nominal tariff rate of 20 percent in 2001 to 14 percent in the first year of its accession 
and to gradually reduce it to 12.9 percent by 2004. The target date for tariff reductions was 2002, 
except for 137 items that are under tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Of the 41 products that were under 
import quota restrictions before accession, 18 were moved to tariffication after WTO accession. 
Rice received a special exemption and the remaining 22 items are governed by the tariff rate 
quota regime. 
Similar to Korea, the special treatment of rice is based on the rules of Annex V of the 
URAA. The quota of rice imports was set in 2002 at 8 percent of the average domestic 
consumption between 1990 and 1992 (144,720 tons of brown rice). By negotiation, this amount 
was divided into governmental and private import quotas. The government rice quota (65 percent 
of rice imports) was subject to the same treatment as rice purchased from local growers. The 
imported rice cannot be exported for food aid nor can be used for animal feed. The remaining (35  
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percent) was imported by private firms and was allocated on first-come-first-serve basis. For both 
private and government quotas, there is a ceiling on the price mark-up of NT$23.26 per kilogram 
for rice and NT$25.59 for rice products when they are sold on the domestic market. If the sale of 
quota rice is slow, the price mark-up can be cut by NT$3 every two weeks. The mark-up 
reduction can be continued until all of the quantities are sold out. 
 
 
Measurement of distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
The main focus of the present that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be 
under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural 
development with a sectoral view alone, the project‘s methodology not only estimates the effects 
of direct agricultural policy measures (including any distortions in the foreign exchange market), 
but also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation. 
Specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for farmers including an 
adjustment for direct interventions on inputs such as border protection on fertilizers. It also 
generates an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural 
tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 2008).  
The commodities for which we calculate a NRA include rice, wheat, barley, soybean, 
beef, pigmeat, poultry, egg, and milk for Japan and Korea. For Taiwan, we calculate estimates for 
rice, wheat, beef, pigmeat, poultry, and egg. Domestic prices are converted to US dollars using 
market rates of foreign exchange rates except for 1955-64 in Korea and for 1955-61 in Taiwan, 
for which the shadow exchange rates estimated for Korea by Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975) 
and for Taiwan by Scott (1979) are used to take into account the distortions to the foreign 
exchange market in early years. Aggregate NRAs on output for each county are calculated using 
weights based on domestic production of commodities valued at undistorted prices. 
In addition to the commodities above covered in this study, several other crops are 
included in the calculation of RRAs for Japan and Korea. These include apple, cabbage, 
cucumber, grape, mandarin, pear, spinach, strawberry, onion, and sugar for Japan, and cabbage, 
red pepper, and garlic for Korea. The estimates for these products come from the OECDs  
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estimates of producer and consumer support estimates, PSEs and CSEs (OECD 2007). The data 
for these crops are available only since 1986. We assume distortions of those crops prior to 1986 
were at the level of 20 percent in Japan and 90 percent in Korea of the NRAs for the available 
covered products.     
The percentage of agricultural output covered in this study is between 55 and 70 (valued 
at undistorted prices). It is difficult to judge the levels of NRAs for the residual products. We 
assume it is made up of the following share trends (at distorted prices) between 1955 and the 
present: import-competing 50 to 80 percent and non-tradables 50 to 20 percent in Japan and 
Korea. Distortions of the residual products are assumed to be zero for non-tradables, and the 
same as that of the 11 (Japan) and 4 (Korea) OECD products for import-competing products. For 
Taiwan, we assume that the distortions of all the non-covered residual products are zero, because 
most of them are non-tradable or exportable. 
To compute the RRA, we estimate the NRA for non-agricultural industries. For the latter, 
weighted tariffs were available in only selected years for Japan, Korea and Taiwan. We linearly 
interpolated for the years between those for which the data are available. For the early years the 
tariff rates are estimated as total tariff revenue divided by value of imports. Assuming the 
exportable industries receive no assistance, the weighted average tariff is multiplied by the share 
of import-competing industries in the value of all non-agricultural tradables. This procedure is 
likely to underestimate assistance to non-agricultural industries, especially in Korea where 
subsidized credits to target industries were the major form of assistance.   
The estimation results for nominal and relative rates of assistance (NRA and RRA) to 
selected commodities are summarized in five-year averages in Tables 3 and 4 for Japan, Tables 5 
and 6 for Korea, and Tables 7 and 8 for Taiwan.
9  Annual movements of the RRA are shown in 
Figure 1 to compare protection patterns in the three economies of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
                                                 
9 The NRAs for commodities are different from those estimated by OECD. Major differences between our study for 
NRA and OECD study for PSE are two-fold: (1) our domestic prices are wholesale prices whereas OECD uses 
farm-gate prices for PSE and prices paid by consumers at the farm-gate level for CSE; and (2) border prices in our 
calculations are based on the study in Anderson and Hayami (1986) whereas OECD uses a different set of reference 
prices. . The fact that the producer price was often above the wholesale (consumer) price in the case of grains and 
soybean in Japan and Korea is captured by setting the NRA equal to the measured CTE times the ratio NRA/CTE in 
Anderson, Hayami with associates (1986) and Anderson (1989) for the period to 1985 and times the negative of the 
ratio PSE/CSE in OECD (2007) for the period from 1986. Most differences in NRA between OECD and our 
measures come from the differences in border prices. For example, our border price of rice is common for Japan and 
Korea as the world import unit value adjusted by a quality coefficient. But OECD‘s border price of rice in Japan is  
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Japan‘s RRA was 13 percent in 1955 when Japan was in the lower middle-income stage 
of economic development. But it soon rose to the 30-40 percent range in the 1960s when Japan 
entered in the upper middle-income stage. However, the RRA of Korea and Taiwan, both in the 
low-income stage in the 1950s and the lower middle-income stage in the 1960s, were at very low 
levels, involving negative rates for some years before the mid-1970s.  
After Japan entered the high-income stage in the 1970s, it increased its RRA steadily 
except during the period of the ―World Food Crises‖ in 1973-4. It reached a peak in 1994, 
although this year followed a bad rice harvest (one-quarter below average). Japan‘s RRA was 
within the 100-150 percent range after the mid-1980s, except in 1994. 
In Korea the rapid rise of agricultural assistance began in the late 1970s when the country 
moved from the lower to the upper middle-income stage. Taiwan followed Korea with an 
increase in the RRA, but the difference in the level of the RRA between the two economies 
continued to be significant during their upper middle-income stage. It is interesting to see that 
Taiwan was behind Korea in terms of the RRA level until the mid-1990s. After this time, 
however, Korea‘s RRA fell. After Korea and Taiwan entered the high-income stage in the 1990s, 
a relatively high RRA was maintained although there were some fluctuations in both economies.  
The wide fluctuations in the RRA in the late 1990s were caused by the currency crises in 
Asia that began in 1997. This resulted in a sharp decline in the RRA in Korea in 1997 and 1998. 
Sharp increases in Taiwan‘s RRA in 1999 and 2000 were caused by shortages of livestock 
products due to the September 1999 earthquake and reduced production of pigmeat resulting 
from the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among pigs in 1997. Although the paths of the RRAs 
were different during the middle-income stage, both Korea and Taiwan started at slightly 
negative protection levels in the low-income stage in the 1960s and reached very high RRAs 
(about 120 percent in Korea and 70 percent in Taiwan) by the beginning of the new millennium. 
                                                                                                                                                              
based on the price of rice imports by Japan and that for Korea is China‘s export price of rice adjusted by 
transportation costs and, from 2001, average import prices of rice from China, the U.S. and Thailand. This makes our 
series of NRAs for rice more stable than that of OECD‘s in recent years. This also explains the stability of our NRA 
for Korean rice compared with that of OECD‘s. For meat products also the border prices are different. In the 
estimation of NRAs for beef, pork and chicken the OECD uses basically the meat data of the US or Canada for 
border prices while we use Japan‘s import price for beef and unit values for pork and chicken (or Hong Kong import 
prices for the 1950s). Our approach is preferred for estimating NRAs consistently for longer time periods, 
particularly for the period when Korean imports were absent or negligible. Also, our approach is preferred for 
comparing the NRAs between Korea and Taiwan on a similar basis for the border prices.    
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Movements of the NRA for covered farm products are similar to those of the RRA in all 
three economies until the late 1970s, when the growth of the NRA in non-agriculture was much 
faster, particularly in Taiwan. In contrast to the path of the RRA, Taiwan kept pace with Korea in 
terms of the growth of the NRA for agriculture, albeit about ten years behind. Taiwan then caught 
up with Japan and Korea at a 150-180 percent NRA in the late 1990s. 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan maintained policies to protect covered agricultural products that 
were considered politically important and sensitive. However, the importance of these covered 
products declined over time with a smaller share of those commodities in the value of production. 
Thus the growth in the RRA was less than that in the NRA because the RRA takes into account 
the non-distorted uncovered products whose share in value of production increased.   
Fluctuations in the RRA and NRA consist mainly of changes in the NRA of individual 
commodities and changes in the weight of each commodity. In Japan, Korea and Taiwan the 
most important agricultural product was rice. Its protection therefore had a large influence on the 
RRA. A clear upward trend in the NRA of rice was present in all three economies (Figure 2). In 
Japan, the NRA for rice was as high as nearly 100 percent in the 1960s when Japan had already 
entered the upper middle stage, whereas it was nearly zero in Korea and Taiwan in the lower 
middle-income stage. From the late 1970s when Korea and Taiwan approached the upper 
middle-income stage, the rice NRA began to rise sharply and continued to rise thereafter.   
The fastest increases in the rice NRA, however, occurred in Japan from the late 1970s. It 
peaked in the late-1980s. The fast increase in the rice NRA in Japan was caused, to a large extent, 
by a rapid appreciation of the Japanese yen relative to the US dollar. The border price of rice 
declined sharply, but there was no transmission to domestic market prices because of the control 
of rice imports by the government. The peak of the rice NRA in Japan was temporarily 
interrupted by a bad rice harvest in 1993 which resulted in a shortage of Japonica rice on world 
markets. This raised border prices, while domestic prices were kept relatively stable under the 
Food Control System. Thereafter, further increases in rice NRA was counteracted by yen 
depreciation and also by the acceptance of minimum access obligations in the URAA from 1995 
and the later shift to tariffication in 1999.   
In Korea and Taiwan, the rising trend of rice continued after the 1970s. Such increases in 
the NRA of rice are a major factor underlying rapid increases in the RRA in Korea during the 
upper middle-income stage, because the weight of rice in agricultural production continued to be  
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high. Korea‘s exemption from tariffication in the URAA allowed the NRA for rice to grow even 
under the implementation of WTO commitments. 
Similar to the NRA for covered products in Figure 1, Taiwan followed Korea in the 
growth of the NRA for rice with a five to eight year lag for the period from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1990s. The gap in NRAs for rice between Taiwan and Korea widened in recent years, but the 
protection level of rice in Taiwan appears to be maintaining a rising trend.  
 
 
Consumer tax equivalents on food 
 
The support provided to farmers in Japan, Korea and Taiwan has mostly come via food import 
restrictions, but in addition there have been schemes whereby crop producer prices have been 
supported above those charged to grain and soybean consumers (including feedmixers providing 
livestock producers with animal feedstuffs). Thus the CTE is below the NRA for some crop 
products. As a result of that, together with the different weights of various products in 
consumption as compared with production, the average NRA for covered products is around 50 
percent above the CTE for both Japan and Korea in 2000-04 (compare Tables 3 and 5). Thus 
consumers have been spared some of the implicit tax that otherwise would have been imposed on 
them had border measures alone been used to raise producer prices above international levels. 
 
 
Sources of agricultural protection growth 
 
 
The experiences of Japan, Korea and Taiwan are good examples of policy switching from 
exploitation to protection of agriculture when economies grow through industrial development. 
This shift is most clearly illustrated by the cases of Korea and Taiwan, whose agricultural 
protection levels were negative in the 1950s and the 1960s and began the rise sharply from the 
1970s with the success of industrial development. 
In Anderson, Hayami and Honma (1986), the growth of agricultural protection in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan is empirically documented. They draw attention to three characteristics of the  
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East Asian growth of agricultural protection, based on the nominal rates of protection for 
agricultural products, in comparison with other advanced economies: first, the rapid rise over 
time in protection rates in the three economies in East Asia; second, the increase in agricultural 
protection in East Asia was much faster than for other industrial countries for the period of 1955 
to 1980; and third, the highest level of agricultural protection the three economies reached as of 
1980 was rivaled only by Switzerland. They also note that the growth of agricultural protection in 
these economies during the three decades to 1980 was exceptionally rapid, compared with that of 
earlier starters of industrialization in the West. That is, East Asia was not exceptional in having 
increasing agricultural protection, but was exceptional in its speed in reaching the world‘s highest 
level. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the protection growth in terms of RRA and NRA continued at 
the same speed for about 20 years after the previous study period. 
The rapid growth of agricultural protection in industrializing economies was largely 
explained by the shift in comparative advantage away from agriculture to industry as the result of 
successful industrialization. The decline in agriculture‘s comparative advantage increased the 
intersectoral resource adjustment costs that had to be shouldered by farmers if left to the 
competitive market mechanism. That boosted their demand for agricultural protection. This 
problem typically applies where industrial growth has been so rapid that intersectoral adjustments 
are not fast enough under free markets to prevent a widening rural-urban income disparity.
10 
The association between the rise in agricultural protection and the decline in agriculture‘s 
comparative advantage was tested in Honma and Hayami (1986) using multiple regression 
analysis and a pooled data set for 15 countries at 6 points of time ending in 1980. A strong 
correlation was found between the level of aggregate NRP
11 and the index of agriculture‘s labor 
productivity relative to total economy‘s labor productivity. According to those results, Honma 
and Hayami conclude that the high level of agricultural protection in East Asia resulted not so 
much from factors unique to East Asia but mainly from factors common to all industrial 
countries.  
However, it should be noted that there are differences in the process of the intersectoral 
resource adjustment between Japan and other two economies. In 1955, the first year for our 
                                                 




investigation, Japan was already in the middle-income stage of economic development and 
entering the so-called ―High Growth Era‖ characterized by extremely rapid industrialization.
12 
This was associated with a widening income gap between rural and urban households. Japan 
increased its agricultural protection soon after it entered the High Growth Era, an era in which 
Japan moved from a middle-income to a high-income economy in less than two decades. Japan‘s 
agricultural protection was raised to a level comparable with that of the European Community 
during the 1960s. 
Meanwhile, Korea and Taiwan were still in the low-income stage of economic 
development in the 1950s. They entered the middle-income stage early in the 1960s. In the 
middle-income stage, productivity growth in agriculture tended to lag behind that of 
non-agriculture as a result of successful industrialization. With delays in labor out-migration 
from farming, farmers‘ income levels tended to decline relative to those of non-farmers. 
Nevertheless, it was impossible for the government in the middle-income stage to secure 
sufficient finance from non-agricultural sectors to raise support for farmers to the extent needed 
to close the income gap. This is because agriculture was too large a sector in terms of its shares of 
both national income and the labor force. Thus despite growing rural-urban income disparity, 
Korea and Taiwan retained low levels of agricultural protection until the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, respectively. 
The agricultural problem confronted by middle-income economies like Korea and Taiwan 
in the 1960s and 1970s has been called the ―disparity problem‖ by Hayami (2005) and Hayami 
and Godo (2004), referring to the income disparity between farm and on-farm households. The 
problem is a lag in productivity growth in agriculture relative to non-agriculture, brought about 
by insufficient labor out-migration from farming in response to the successful industrialization 
that raised these economies to the middle-income stage. Farmers, who observe non-farm 
workers‘ rapid escape from poverty, begin to realize how relatively poor they are, even if their 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 Actual data used for the level of agricultural protection in the regression analysis are the nominal protection 
coefficients (NPC = 1+NRP/100). 
12 Indeed Japan‘s tariff protection for rice began in 1904 and, after 1918 included its colonies of Korea and Taiwan 
in what became an imperial rice self sufficiency policy. An earlier set of estimates of the nominal rate of rice 
protection suggests it grew from 9 percent in 1903-07 to 21 percent in 1908-12 and 27 percent in 1913-17. It then fell 
to an average of 13 percent in 1918-27 with the greater inflow of rice from the colonies, before rising again to 26 
percent in 1928-32, 45 percent in 1933-37 and 84 percent in 1938, according to Anderson, Hayami and Honma 
(1986). See also Table 7 below for new estimates for an even longer period.  
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income level did not decrease from the previous stage. The resulting dissatisfaction among 
farmers often becomes a significant source of social instability. Once an economy reaches the 
middle-income stage, that dissatisfaction becomes a prime concern of policymakers who might 
adopt agricultural protection measures to appease farmers and prevent the dissatisfaction 
elevating into a serious anti-governmental movement.  
That protection may not be strong enough to close the income gap between farmers and 
urban workers until the country graduates from the lower middle-income stage, however. 
Because the shares of agriculture in both national income and the labor force are still large, it is 
difficult to either (a) raise sufficient revenue from the non-farm sectors to close the growing 
farm-nonfarm income gap with direct support payments or (b) pass on the cost of agricultural 
protection to consumers by raising food import barriers, because increases in food prices erode 
real wages paid by the large number of small-scale enterprises that rely heavily on cheap labor. 
Faced with the disparity problem, policymakers in middle-income countries are forced to search 
for ways and means to protect farmers within the constraint of the food problem that is still 
binding because a large number of urban workers are still absolutely poor and so still have a high 
share of food in their household expenditure. 
In the early 1990s when all three Northeast Asian economies entered the high-income 
stage, the decline in relative agricultural income (in terms of agricultural GDP per worker divided 
by total GDP per worker) stopped in Japan and Korea. In Taiwan, the relative agricultural income 
continued to decline until recently (Table 1), despite the high level of agricultural protection. The 
reason why Taiwan‘s relative agricultural income continued to decline was that Taiwan increased 
its total economy‘s labor productivity more rapidly than agriculture‘s labor productivity even 
after 1990. 
Agricultural protection in Korea rose faster and to higher levels than in Taiwan and Japan 
during the upper-middle income stage. The RRAs in Korea are located significantly above those 
of Taiwan and Japan for the same levels of per-capita incomes throughout their upper 
middle-income stage (Figure 3). The difference could reflect the different costs of intersectoral 
adjustment (corresponding to changes in comparative advantage) that farmers had to shoulder. In 
Korea the shift of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture involved the migration for workers 
from rural to urban areas, whereas in Taiwan and Japan much of the shift was done by farmers‘ 
increased non-farm activities while continuing to live in their home villages and towns and  
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farming part-time. Correspondingly, both the pecuniary and psychological costs of intersectoral 
labor reallocation were much higher for farmers in Korea. 
In Japan the decline in relative agricultural income ceased in the 1970s when Japan 
reached the high-income stage. This was due to a deceleration in the growth of labor productivity 
in the total economy after reaching the high-income stage. The Korean experience after 1990 is 
likely to be explained by fast increases in agricultural labor productivity resulting from the rapid 
out-migration of agricultural labor to urban activities (Table 1). 
The relationship between relative agricultural income and the RRA in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan for 1955-2004 is shown in Figure 4.
13 There is a negative correlation for all countries and 
all periods, except Korea in 1990 and 2000. The correlation is, however, weak when relative 
agricultural income is around 40 percent or more. This corresponds to the low-income and lower 
middle-income stages of economic development.  
Korea and Taiwan strengthened their agricultural protection policies in the 1980s when 
both economies entered in the upper middle-income stage. This followed Japan‘s protection 
pattern in the 1960s when the income gap was widening and protection measures were deemed 
necessary to close it. Under such circumstances in the upper middle-income economies, 
politicians were not able to resist pressure from the farm lobby and thus instituted policies to 
prevent farmers‘ incomes from lagging behind those of non-farm workers. 
In addition, Korea may have had a specific reason for strengthening agricultural 
protection, particularly at the farm-gate level. The constant threat of communist aggression from 
the north prompted commercial and industrial interests to support farmers and thereby maintain 
political stability. 
If the income gap was adequately dealt with during the middle-income stage, problems 
caused by agricultural protection in the following upper middle-income stage might have been 
avoided. Yet, in academic and policy debate, the disparity problem in the middle-income stage 
has received relatively little attention, despite the fact that there are today many economies 
attempting to reach the upper middle and high-income stage through industrialization. The 
growing income disparity between farm and non-farm populations could become a major source 
                                                 
13 RRA of 1955-59 average is paired with agricultural GDP per worker relative to total GDP per worker in 1955 and 
so on.    
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of social and political instability elsewhere in Asia, from ASEAN to China and eventually to 
South Asia, particularly India. 
In the analysis by Honma and Hayami (1986), it was found that political power in the 
agricultural sector is maximized when the share of agriculture declines to 4 to 5 percent of GDP 
or 5 to 8 percent of the labor force. Japan has passed this range, Korea recently entered this peak 
zone in terms of both GDP and labor force, as did Taiwan in terms of the labor share (having 
passed over this zone in 1990 in terms of GDP share). Political economy factors may well 
underlie the rise of agricultural protectionism in Korea at the high-income stage after 1990, as 





Japan’s pre-Second World War experience   
 
 
The pattern of agricultural protection growth in Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the era of 
East Asian Economic Miracle, as outlined in the previous section, was very consistent with the 
hypothesis that rapid protection growth occurred when these economies were in the 
middle-income stage under the dictate of the ―disparity problem‖ described above. Under the 
disparity problem, when farmers‘ income levels tend to decline relative to non-farmers‘, the 
economy is often characterized by a dual structure: a formal sector consisting of large modern 
enterprises and government agencies, and an informal sector consisting of agriculture and other 
small/medium-scale enterprises. That was the case for Japan in the half-century before the 
Second World War. In this period Japan advanced from the low-income to the middle-income 
stage of economic development.   
Japan set upon modern economic growth with the Meiji restoration of 1868 that 
transformed its political structure. Japan went from a union of feudal fiefs under the hegemony of 
Tokugawa shogun (Tycoon) to a modern nation state in the form of the constitutional monarchy 
                                                 
14 The shares of Korean agriculture in GDP and the labor force were 3.8 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively, in 
2004, while those in Taiwan were 1.7 percent of GDP and 7.5 percent of the labor force in that year (Table 1, rows 2 
and 3).  
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under an emperor who was a symbol of national unification without actual ruling power. The 
immediate impetus for this political reorganization was the threat of colonization by western 
powers that became obvious through the gunboat diplomacy of the United States and the use of 
Admiral Perry‘s fleet. The national slogan of the Meiji state was to establish fukoku kyouhei (a 
wealthy nation and strong army) for the sake of preserving national independence. To achieve 
this prime goal, economic policies in Meiji Japan were aimed at the promotion of modern 
industries to catch up to the economic power of western nations. Japan at that time was deprived 
of the freedom to set import and export duties above 5 percent ad valorem levels according to 
unequal commercial treaties signed by the Tokugawa tycoon with Western powers in the 
mid-19
th century. Thus, industrial promotion policy relied mainly on subsidies in areas such as 
the import of machines and factories and the purchase of their designs, the employment of 
engineers and skilled workers, and the collection and dissemination of information on overseas 
technologies and markets. It was mainly through taxation of agriculture — through the newly 
established land tax system — that subsidies for industrial promotion as well as for other 
modernization measures were financed.   
As the data in Table 6 show, in the early Meiji period (before 1900) the agricultural sector 
shouldered about 90 percent of the total direct tax burden, which amounted to about 15 percent of 
agricultural GDP. At this time agriculture‘s share of the national government‘s subsidy amounted 
to less than one-quarter, which was less than 5 percent of agricultural GDP. Evidently, at the 
beginning of its modern economic growth, Japan adhered to the strategy of promoting modern 
sectors through the exploitation of the traditional sectors, which is a strategy commonly practiced 
by developing economies when they became independent of colonial powers around the early 
1960s. Imbalanced taxation and subsidization as between agriculture and non-agriculture was 
even greater than the data of Table 6 reveal, as a disproportionately high share of the population 
educated at publicly-financed schools were from non-farm households.   
Under strong promotion by the government, industrialization progressed rapidly in Japan, 
especially in the area of labor-intensive manufacturing. Comparative advantage in this sector was 
unhampered owing to virtual free trade in the absence of tariff autonomy in Japan. 
Changes in the position of agriculture in the total economy over the course of modern 
economic development under the Meiji restoration are summarized in Table 7. The series of real 
GDP per capita show that the Japanese economy moved from the low-income to the  
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middle-income stage by the beginning of the 20th century, with the share of agriculture in GDP 
at about 40 percent. This is roughly comparable to Korea and Taiwan‘s share of agriculture in 
GDP when they advanced to the middle-income stage. Thereafter, Japan remained at the status of 
a lower-middle-income economy until the Second World War. Meanwhile, the growth of labor 
productivity in agriculture lagged behind that of industry, resulting in a continual decline in the 
ratio of labor productivity in agriculture to labor productivity in industry (column 6). This reflects 
successful industrial development (as in Korea and Taiwan during the era of East Asia‘s 
Economic Miracle). Nevertheless, because the terms of trade did not improve for agriculture 
throughout the inter-war period (column7), income per-capita in farm households continued to 
decline relative to that of farm employees‘ households, parallel to the declines in 
agriculture/industry real productivity ratio (column 8 of Table 7). 
Growing dissatisfaction among farmers in Japan gave rise to strong political lobbying — 
organized by the politically powerful landlords — for reduced tax burdens and increased support 
to agriculture. The result was a significant reduction in the tax burden and a greater allocation of 
government subsidies to agriculture in the first half of the 20
th century. Before the beginning of 
the 20th century, landlords were largely satisfied by the government‘s support to agricultural 
research and extension services and land infrastructure improvements such as irrigation and 
drainage systems, which proved to be highly effective in raising rice yields per hectare and 
thereby raising land prices and land rents for the benefits of landlords (Hayami and Yamada 1991, 
pp. 68-77). However, as comparative advantage continued to be lost from agriculture — owing to 
rapid industrial development — landlords‘ demands began to shift toward border protection on 
agricultural commodities, especially rice. Their strong lobbying achieved the installation of a rice 
tariff at 15 percent ad valorem in the first year of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). This tariff 
was approved under the excuse of raising government revenue to finance the war. It was 
supposed to be terminated at the War‘s end, but the landed interests lobbied extensively to make 
it permanent in the form of a specific duty. Thereafter, the rice tariff became an issue of a major 
public controversy in Japan — similar to the controversy caused by the Corn Laws in the UK a 
century earlier and German grain tariffs a half century later. The imperial Agricultural Society, 
representing the landed interests, and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, representing the 
interests of manufacturers and traders of export commodities, lobbied strongly for opposite ends.  
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The battle ended with a victory to the landed interests and the successful imposition of a specific 
duty on rice at one yen per 60 kilograms.   
This outcome contrasts with the victory of the bourgeoisie in the UK and the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846; and resembles the situation in Germany in which tariff protection was 
installed on food grains (wheat and rye) in 1879 under Bismarck. Unlike the UK, which was able 
to establish itself as the workshop of the world, the comparative advantage of industry was less 
certain in Germany, so that industrialists found it advantageous to seek protection on their 
products while approving some protections on agriculture. In addition, the rapid growth of the 
Social Democratic Party — a labor party initially based on orthodox Marxist doctrine — was 
considered a common menace by the Junkers and the Industrialists. In fact, the installment of the 
grain tariffs and iron and steel tariffs in Germany at the same time was the result of a united 
campaign of landlords in Eastern Germany (Junkers) and Industrialists in West Germany 
(Gerschenkron 1943). This experience was repeated by other late starters of industrialization such 
as France and Italy who tried to match the UK in industrial strength (Kindleberger 1951). Japan‘s 
protectionist policies were similar: after tariff autonomy was recovered in 1911, Japanese 
industrialists actively lobbied for industrial protection, especially in heavy and chemical 
industries. They also campaigned for reductions in tariffs on imports of industrial raw materials 
such as raw cotton and iron ore (Little, Scitovsky and Scott 1970; Yamazawa 1984). 
As a result, Japan saw the emergence of tariff escalation, with lower rates applied to 
materials for industrial processing and higher rates applied to its imports of processed final 
products. Although agricultural production was raised by means of increases in food tariff rates, 
this was largely paralleled by increases in industrial tariff rates, which can be inferred from the 
movements in the average tariff rate for all products compared with the movements in just the 
rice tariff rate (columns 4 and 5 of Table 7). However, tariffs were largely exempt on the imports 
of raw materials for industrial production, so effective rates of industrial protection were much 
higher than the nominal rates implied by the tariff rates. In particular, a zero tariff on raw cotton 
was instrumental in making the cotton spinning industry the top foreign exchange earner in Japan 
and, at the same time, completely eradicated domestic cotton farming. 
Although the rice tariff was raised successively from 14 percent ad valorem in 1910 to 41 
percent in 1935, which with quantitative import restrictions increased the nominal rate of 
protection on rice from 21 percent in 1900 to 134 percent in 1935, improvement in the terms of  
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trade for agriculture was slower than the decline in the agriculture/industry labor productivity 
ratio. This resulted in the continual decline of farmers‘ household income per capita relative to 
that of non-farmers‘ throughout the inter-war period (Table 7). Although agricultural protection 
began to increase significantly during this period, it was evidently insufficient to counteract the 
loss of agriculture‘s comparative advantage owing to rapid industrial development. To undertake 
agricultural protection at a scale sufficient to close the widening income disparity, Japan waited 
until after the Second World War when the Japanese economy advanced to the upper 
middle-income and the high-income stages so that non-agricultural sectors could bear the cost of 
agricultural protection. In the early 20
th century, the share of food in household consumption 
expenditure (the Engel coefficient) was higher than 60 percent. This implies that the elevation of 
food prices had a large effect on the cost of living and, hence, on the wage rate of workers, which 
caused serious damage to labor-intensive industries, which were then at the center of the 
Japanese economy. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the fear that high food prices would damage 
industrial development was a major motive in the Government‘s decision to launch rice 
development programs in Korea and Taiwan following the rice riot in 1918. This is despite 
opposition from landlords in Japan against policies fostering competitors to Japanese rice 
farming. The importation of Japonica rice free of tariffs from the two colonies became a major 
factor aggravating agricultural depression in Japan during the 1930s. 
The situation changed dramatically after Japan advanced to the upper middle-income stage 
in the 1960s as a forerunner of the East Asian Miracle. Although supports on agricultural product 
prices were raised rapidly, industrial wage rates were raised even faster, so that the Engel 
coefficient fell from 52 percent in 1955 to 31 percent in 1980 and further to 17 percent in 1995 
(Hayami and Godo 2002, p. 132). Meanwhile, the center of gravity in Japanese industry moved 
from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital- and knowledge-intensive activities. Under this 
environment, Japanese industrialists were able to tolerate increases in food prices so as to prevent 
farm-nonfarm income disparity from widening. Industrialists found it was to their advantage to 
support farmers, to keep them as allies against organized labor and left-wing activities under the 
cold war regime (similar to the attitude of German industrialists toward the grain tariff campaign 
a century earlier). The major surge of Japan‘s agricultural protectionism continued until it was 








This chapter examines changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in terms of price 
distortions in Japan, Korea and Taiwan in a manner consistent with the methodology in Anderson 
et al (2008). Rates of assistance to the agricultural sector are estimated for Japan and Korea for 
1955-2004 and for Taiwan for 1955-2002. These are based on estimates of the nominal rates of 
assistance for selected individual commodities and the relative rates of assistance (RRA) as 
between agricultural and industry. The estimates show that the growth of agricultural protection 
in Northeast Asia, together with the decline of industrial protection rates, caused the RRA to rise 
there over the five post-War decades under investigation.  
The experience in these three economies can be explained by factors common to rapidly 
industrializing economies, especially the high cost of industrial adjustment shouldered by farm 
producers in the process of rapid industrial development. However, the agricultural protection 
level continued to grow even after 1980 in all the three economies despite apparently decreased 
needs for agricultural support to prevent widening rural-urban income disparity. 
All the three economies suffered problems commonly observed in the high-income stage 
of economic development, notably a widening income gap between agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors as the economy entered the middle-income stage. If the income gap had 
been dealt with more appropriately at the middle-income stage, problems caused by agricultural 
protection in the following high-income stage could have been significantly reduced. 
Greater attention needs to be paid to the agricultural problem in the middle-income stage, 
the so-called ―disparity problem‖. The challenge at that stage of development is to find a 
compromise between the conflicting needs to reduce the farm-nonfarm income gap on the one 
hand, and the supply of low-cost food to a large number of workers in urban areas on the other, 
when the government‘s capacity to raise sufficient revenue from non-agricultural sectors is weak 
and food import restrictions effectively tax net buyers of food. The somewhat contrasting patterns 
of agricultural and industrial growth between Korea and Taiwan led to different solutions to that 
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Figure 1: Relative rate of assistance to agricultural versus non-agricultural tradables,
a Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007   




















t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors‘ spreadsheet  
 
40 
Figure 2: Nominal rate of assistance to rice, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 
 













Source: Authors‘ spreadsheet  
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Figure 3: Relative rate of assistance to agriculture and real GDP per capita, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, 1955 to 2004 
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Figure 4: Relative rate of assistance to agriculture and relative GDP per agricultural worker, 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2004 
 





Source: Authors‘ computations  
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Table 1: Economic growth and structural transformation in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 
2004 
 
      1955   1960   1970   1980   1990   2000  
Real GDP per capita in 
2000 constant $ prices
a   
Japan   3,128   4,509   11,391   15,520   21,703   23,971  
Korea   1,429   1,458   2,552   4,497   9,593   15,702  
Taiwan   1,241   1,444   2,846   5,963   11,248   19,184  
Share of agriculture in 
GDP (percent)  
Japan   17.4   9.0    4.2   2.4   1.7   1.1  
Korea   46.9   39.1   29.2   16.2   8.9   4.9  
Taiwan   28.9   28.2   15.3   7.5   4.0    2.0   




Japan   33.8   26.8   15.9   9.1   6.2   4.5   
Korea   79.7   60.2   49.1   37.1   18.1   10.0   
Taiwan   53.6   50.2   36.7   19.5   12.8   8.9  
Share of farm 
household popn in total 
population (percent)  
Japan   40.7   36.5   25.1   18.3   14   8.2  
Korea   61.9   58.2   44.7   28.4   15.5   8.6  
Taiwan   50.7   49.8   40.9   30.3   21.1   16.5  
Agricultural GDP per 
worker / total GDP per 
worker (percent)  
Japan   51.5    33.6    26.4    26.4    27.4    24.4   
Korea   58.8    65.0    59.5    43.7    49.2    49.0   
Taiwan   53.9    56.2    41.7    38.5    31.3    22.5   
 
a Shares of agriculture in GDP and labor force include forestry and fisheries. 
 
Sources: Heston, Summers and Aten (2006); JMAFF, Nogyo Hakusho Fuzoku Tokei-hyo 
(Statistical Appendix of Agricultural White Paper), various issues; Korean Government, Major 
Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, various issues. Taiwan Government, Taiwan 




Table 2: Changes in agricultural structure in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2004 
 
        1955  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2004 
Number of farm 
households (‗000) 
Japan  6,043  6,057  5,342  4,661  3,835  3,120  2,934 
Korea  2,218  2,350  2,483  2,155  1,768  1,383  1,240 
Taiwan  733  786  880  891  860  721  721 
Population in farm 
households (‗000) 
Japan  36,347  34,411  26,282  21,366  17,296  10,467  9,400 
Korea  13,300  14,559  14,422  10,827  6,661  4,031  3,415 
Taiwan  4,603  5,373  5,997  5,389  4,289  3,669  3,225 
Persons per farm 
household 
Japan  6.01    5.68    4.92    4.58    4.51    3.35    3.20   
Korea  6.00    6.20    5.81    5.02    3.77    2.91    2.75   
Taiwan  6.28    6.84    6.81    6.05    4.99    5.09    4.47   
Arable land 
(‗000ha) 
Japan  6,095  6,071  5,796  5,461  5,243  4,830  4,714 
Korea  1,995  2,025  2,298  2,196  2,109  1,918  1,836 
Taiwan  873  869  905  907  890  852  836 
Arable land per 
farm household 
(ha) 
Japan  1.01    1.00    1.08    1.17    1.37    1.55    1.61   
Korea  0.90    0.86    0.93    1.02    1.19    1.39    1.48   
Taiwan  1.19    1.11    1.03    1.02    1.03    1.18    1.16   
Share of agric 
income in total 
farm household 
income ( percent) 
Japan  70.7    49.5    31.9    17.0    13.8    13.1    14.3   
Korea  na  na  75.8    65.2    56.8    47.2    39.3   
Taiwan  na  na  48.7  24.8  20.1  17.6  22.0 
Share of rice in 
value of agric. 
production 
(percent) 
Japan  na  47.4  37.9  30.0    27.8  25.4  22.8 
Korea  na  59.3  37.3  34.1  36.9  32.9  27.6 
Taiwan  37.4    36.5    25.7    19.8    12.1    9.6    7.1   
 
Sources:  JMAFF,  Nogyo  Hakusho  Fuzoku  Tokei-hyo  (Statistical  Appendix  of  Agricultural 
White Paper);  Korean Government, Major Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; 




Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to selected agricultural products, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 (percent) 
(a) Japan 
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products  53.7  66.5  79.9  77.8  110.8  111.8  153.1  149.3  147.3  146.5  124.3 
Rice  72.5  91.0  122.9  164.9  210.8  267.2  591.6  656.2  535.4  607.0  362.8 
Barley  35.7  38.7  16.5  10.1  63.1  88.6  203.6  141.7  129.0  121.5  197.6 
Wheat  36.1  39.1  42.4  25.4  76.2  111.8  170.3  200.4  204.2  128.6  269.5 
Beef  27.4  68.3  130.8  106.0  215.3  136.7  208.9  177.0  191.8  149.1  39.3 
Pigmeat  17.9  59.8  12.4  -3.4  2.9  12.6  0.5  5.7  10.3  5.5  138.0 
Poultry  33.1  42.8  33.5  36.7  31.1  16.8  17.6  25.1  41.4  74.0  11.7 
Egg  3.0  -3.3  -5.3  -2.8  -3.3  1.4  19.9  23.2  33.8  27.6  17.1 
Milk  44.2  96.2  162.1  165.4  385.7  211.5  365.2  280.3  238.0  273.2  101.0 
Apple  na  na  na  na  na  na  32.0  24.1  27.7  31.4  17.3 
Cabbage  na  na  na  na  na  na  10.3  31.1  127.5  177.5  204.6 
Cucumber  na  na  na  na  na  na  57.1  17.4  29.8  43.2  31.1 
Grape  na  na  na  na  na  na  87.2  82.2  117.7  177.4  178.6 
Mandarin  na  na  na  na  na  na  21.1  44.8  47.3  32.4  46.4 
Pear  na  na  na  na  na  na  35.0  24.0  64.2  157.3  128.7 
Spinach  na  na  na  na  na  na  89.2  138.0  236.7  134.4  32.3 
Strawberry  na  na  na  na  na  na  11.0  25.1  26.5  16.8  7.2 
Onion  na  na  na  na  na  na  55.3  80.8  144.4  284.2  294.9 
Soybean  na  na  na  na  na  410.7  259.4  21.3  42.2  67.2  68.5 
Sugar  na  na  na  na  na  229.6  198.3  158.4  159.0  154.7  106.6 
                       
Exportables  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap. 
                       
Total of covered products  53.7  66.5  79.9  77.8  110.8  111.8  153.1  149.3  147.3  146.5  107.4 
  -- from domestic measures  -0.4  3.1  10.0  9.2  10.9  9.6  8.0  6.0  4.5  4.5  4.0 
  -- from border (import) measures  54.1  63.4  69.9  68.6  99.9  102.1  145.2  143.3  142.8  142.0  102.9 
Dispersion of covered products 
b   39.4  40.3  69.4  82.2  156.1  142.6  175.3  161.5  136.1  142.5  116.0 




Table 3 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to selected agricultural products, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
(b) Korea 
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products 
a  -3.9  4.4  16.6  47.6  73.8  122.8  166.7  201.9  182.9  213.6  116.4 
Rice  -8.2  -7.0  -5.4  31.3  59.6  118.4  214.4  265.9  294.3  385.9  213.3 
Barley  41.2  83.5  72.3  120.3  101.2  165.9  357.0  524.3  543.0  562.8  275.6 
Wheat  -43.0  -26.7  -11.2  0.4  26.5  92.2  144.4  216.0  122.8  135.4  na 
Beef  38.8  34.4  64.9  73.9  162.6  163.2  126.2  200.8  159.9  167.8  182.3 
Pigmeat  -15.2  21.7  158.7  204.1  202.9  169.1  124.7  149.3  116.2  134.4  103.1 
Poultry  -11.8  6.9  131.4  103.5  161.7  94.2  86.6  155.6  171.7  179.2  55.7 
Egg  -27.1  -24.7  23.0  0.1  -7.5  14.9  19.4  28.0  26.6  54.3  31.6 
Milk  na  na  173.3  108.8  189.0  179.8  185.2  203.7  140.7  149.8  137.0 
Cabbage  na  na  na  na  na  na  30.0  30.0  29.1  27.6  27.0 
Pepper  na  na  na  na  na  na  175.0  245.4  145.5  197.0  235.7 
Soybean  -13.0  18.8  58.8  80.0  122.2  253.0  361.8  508.2  625.6  757.4  729.2 
Garlic  na  na  na  na  na  na  250.3  288.8  213.3  122.6  128.1 
                       
Exportables 
a  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap. 
                       
Total of covered products  -3.9  4.4  16.6  47.6  73.8  122.8  166.7  201.9  182.9  213.6  147.3 
-- from domestic measures  -0.2  -0.4  0.9  4.2  7.1  5.3  5.5  5.9  6.1  5.2  4.4 
-- from border (import) measures  -3.7  4.7  15.7  43.4  66.7  117.5  161.2  196.0  176.9  208.5  143.0 
Dispersion of covered products 
b   34.1  40.5  85.0  82.5  89.0  80.1  114.8  164.2  200.1  225.4  206.0 




Table 3 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to selected agricultural products, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
(c) Taiwan 
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-02  2003-07 
Exportables 
a  -23.5  7.5  5.7  20.7  13.4  35.9  89.5  161.4  167.6  203.1  n.a. 
Rice   -29.6  -6.6  -17.9  -9.4  -7.6  32.5  103.3  161.4  167.6  203.1  n.a. 
Pigmeat 
d  -8.1  64.0  99.7  98.3  60.6  42.6  64.8  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.a. 
                       
Import-competing products 
a  -33.0  5.3  21.7  26.7  32.5  49.1  55.4  93.6  126.3  160.0  n.a. 
Wheat  48.2  36.0  39.4  32.2  57.2  92.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Beef  13.7  41.2  28.8  22.0  79.6  77.0  101.3  98.5  82.6  72.8  n.a. 
Pigmeat 
d  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  107.1  131.3  173.2  n.a. 
Poultry  -47.5  -3.7  21.2  27.1  30.0  63.6  84.6  143.0  228.7  279.5  n.a. 
Egg 
e  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  0.7  26.8  23.9  17.9  24.7  n.a. 
                       
Nontradable 
a  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.a. 
Egg 
e  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.ap.  n.a. 
                       
Total of covered products 
a  -23.2  7.2  6.2  20.0  14.0  35.1  76.1  109.5  134.0  167.8  n.a. 
Dispersion of covered products 
b  33.4  35.3  47.5  40.5  40.5  34.5  56.9  66.1  86.9  106.4  n.a. 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  53  49  49  48  50  42  35  34  35  36  n.a. 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
c n.a. = data not available; n.ap. = not applicable.  
d Pigmeat changed trade status in 1989, from import-competing to exportable. The period average reported here corresponds to 1985-88 for the 
import-competing product, and 1989-94 for the exportable product.  
e Eggs were assumed to be a non-tradable with zero distortions prior to 1983.  
f n.a. = data not available; n.ap. = not applicable (because shown elsewhere in the table with the opposite trade status).  




Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries,




  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Covered products  53.7  66.5  79.9  77.8  110.8  111.8  153.1  149.3  147.3  146.5  107.4 
Non-covered products  5.3  6.5  7.7  8.0  12.1  13.0  23.7  26.7  42.0  50.5  18.6 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  38.8  45.8  50.4  46.9  65.9  68.3  112.4  110.5  112.8  115.2  70.9 
   All importables  46.1  55.0  62.1  58.1  81.2  82.1  127.5  124.4  127.6  129.1  124.3 
   All exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
   All nontradables  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  40.8 
   TBI  -0.32  -0.35  -0.38  -0.37  -0.45  -0.45  -0.56  -0.55  -0.56  -0.56  -0.55 
                       
Non-product specific (NPS)  na  na  na  na  4.8  4.0  6.4  5.8  6.8  5.1  3.3 
   Inputs  na  na  na  na  4.8  4.0  6.4  5.8  6.8  5.1  3.3 
   Other  na  na  na  na  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  38.8  45.8  50.4  46.9  66.8  72.3  118.8  116.3  119.6  120.4  74.3 
                       
Decoupled payments  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.6  15.1  7.1  2.5  2.7  4.6  5.0 
All agriculture (incl NPS & dec)  38.8  45.8  50.4  46.9  70.4  87.4  125.9  118.9  122.3  124.9  79.3 
                       
All agricultral tradables (incl NPS)  46.1  55.0  62.1  58.1  87.6  86.1  133.8  130.2  134.4  134.2  127.7 
All nonag tradables  2.5  3.9  3.8  2.8  1.6  1.1  1.3  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.6 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 





Table 4 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries,




  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Covered products  -3.9  4.4  16.6  47.6  73.8  122.8  166.7  201.9  182.9  213.6  147.3 
Non-covered products  -1.7  -0.2  7.0  15.3  25.3  37.4  64.3  88.0  74.6  71.7  49.3 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  -3.2  4.0  13.4  35.7  56.3  89.4  126.1  152.8  129.8  137.3  80.6 
   All importables  -3.3  4.9  16.3  46.1  71.8  118.6  159.8  197.6  164.8  171.9  116.4 
   All exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
   All nontradables  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   All nontradables  0.03  -0.05  -0.14  -0.32  -0.42  -0.54  -0.62  -0.66  -0.62  -0.63  -0.54 
                       
Non-product specific (NPS)  na  na  na  na  0.6  0.7  2.2  7.1  7.3  4.4  3.9 
   Inputs  na  na  na  na  0.6  0.7  2.2  7.1  7.3  4.4  3.9 
   Other  na  na  na  na  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  -3.2  4.0  13.4  35.7  56.4  90.1  128.1  159.8  137.0  141.7  84.4 
                       
Decoupled payments  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.5  5.3  2.7  7.2  12.3 
All agriculture (incl NPS & dec)  -3.2  4.0  13.4  35.7  56.4  90.5  128.6  165.2  139.7  148.8  96.8 
                       
All agricultral tradables (incl NPS)  -3.3  4.9  16.3  46.1  71.9  119.3  161.7  204.7  171.9  176.3  120.3 
All nonag tradables  45.6  37.1  22.3  11.4  11.7  6.8  5.7  3.3  2.3  1.7  1.5 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 




Table 4 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries,




  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-02  2003-07 
Covered products 
a  -23.2  7.2  6.2  20.0  14.0  35.1  76.1  109.5  134.0  167.8  n.a. 
Non-covered products   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a. 
All agricultural products 
a  -11.8  3.5  3.0  9.2  7.0  14.6  26.4  37.2  45.5  60.0  n.a. 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  -11.8  3.5  3.0  9.2  7.0  14.6  26.4  37.2  45.5  60.0  n.a. 
Trade bias index 
c  -0.15   0.05   0.02   0.12   0.05   0.15   0.27   0.11   0.02   0.00   n.a. 
                       
Assistance to just tradables:                       
   All agricultural tradables  -15.8  4.7  3.9  12.0  8.9  18.5  32.7  45.0  53.6  69.2  n.a. 
   All non-agricultural tradables  8.8  9.3  8.8  7.5  7.0  5.2  4.5  2.6  1.8  1.1  n.a. 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  -22.5  -4.2  -4.5  4.2  1.7  12.7  27.0  41.3  51.0  67.3  n.a. 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
e n.a. = data not available; n.ap. = not applicable.     
 




Table 5: Consumer tax equivalents for selected agricultural products, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
(a) Japan 
  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Apple  na  na  na  na  na  na  30.8  23.8  27.5  31.0  17.0 
Barley  34.9  32.6  10.2  5.8  20.3  29.1  158.1  131.9  118.9  105.9  114.3 
Beef  27.4  68.3  130.8  106.0  215.3  136.7  208.9  177.0  191.8  149.1  38.5 
Cabbage  na  na  na  na  na  na  9.2  30.8  127.0  176.6  204.0 
Cucumber  na  na  na  na  na  na  56.4  17.2  29.7  42.9  30.9 
Egg  3.0  -3.3  -5.3  -2.8  -3.3  1.4  19.7  22.9  33.6  27.2  17.0 
Grape  na  na  na  na  na  na  85.3  81.6  117.2  176.3  177.8 
Mandarin  na  na  na  na  na  na  20.0  44.5  47.0  32.0  46.0 
Milk  44.2  96.2  162.1  165.4  385.7  211.5  365.2  280.3  238.0  273.2  93.5 
Onion  na  na  na  na  na  na  54.0  80.4  143.9  282.9  294.0 
Pear  na  na  na  na  na  na  35.0  24.0  64.2  157.3  103.4 
Pigmeat  17.9  59.8  12.4  -3.4  2.9  12.6  0.5  5.7  10.3  5.5  138.0 
Poultry  33.1  42.8  33.5  36.7  31.1  16.8  17.6  25.1  41.4  74.0  11.7 
Rice  73.1  85.7  103.9  137.3  179.6  232.6  548.5  613.2  506.4  574.6  348.6 
Soybean  na  na  na  na  na  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Spinach  na  na  na  na  na  na  89.2  138.0  236.7  134.4  32.3 
Strawberry  na  na  na  na  na  na  10.0  24.8  26.2  16.4  7.0 
Sugar  na  na  na  na  na  167.0  185.9  154.8  155.4  151.6  119.6 
Wheat  35.9  33.0  27.4  14.1  26.7  37.2  136.1  108.4  73.4  68.7  73.6 
                       
All covered products  53.0  62.2  66.8  67.6  93.2  98.8  134.9  119.3  116.1  106.6  81.0 
        Import-competing    53.0  62.2  66.8  67.6  93.2  98.8  134.9  119.3  116.1  106.6  86.9 
        Exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Dispersion, cov. products





Table 5 (continued): Consumer tax equivalents for selected agricultural products, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
(b) Korea 
Korea  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Wheat  -46.2  -22.5  -11.1  1.1  16.2  46.0  132.8  167.4  80.5  80.6  na 
Barley  40.8  77.8  64.9  96.6  57.3  119.6  325.6  411.5  341.2  327.5  174.4 
Rice  -7.7  -5.5  -5.0  29.1  54.5  113.4  211.5  261.7  290.8  385.3  213.3 
Beef  38.8  34.4  64.9  73.9  162.6  163.2  122.1  200.7  153.9  167.7  182.3 
Pigmeat  -15.2  21.7  158.7  204.1  202.9  169.1  124.7  149.3  116.2  134.4  103.1 
Poultry  -11.8  6.9  131.4  103.5  161.7  94.2  86.6  155.6  171.7  179.2  55.7 
Egg  -27.1  -24.7  23.0  0.1  -7.5  14.9  19.4  28.0  26.6  54.3  31.6 
Milk  na  na  173.3  108.8  189.0  179.8  185.2  203.7  140.7  149.8  137.0 
Cabbage  na  na  na  na  na  na  30.0  30.0  29.1  27.6  27.0 
Pepper  na  na  na  na  na  na  175.0  245.4  145.5  197.0  235.7 
Soybean  -19.8  8.2  51.6  63.2  95.2  245.4  112.2  75.5  63.6  66.8  91.9 
Garlic  na  na  na  na  na  na  250.3  288.8  213.3  122.6  128.1 
                       
All covered products  -5.0  5.4  14.5  39.7  63.9  114.3  148.5  176.4  144.9  154.1  135.1 
   Import-competing    -5.0  5.4  14.5  39.7  63.9  114.3  148.5  176.4  144.9  154.1  115.7 
   Exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Dispersion, cov products









   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-02  2003-07 
 
                     
Rice  -29.6  -6.6  -17.9  -9.4  -7.6  32.5  103.3  161.4  167.6  203.1  na 
Wheat  38.3  16.4  29.6  14.6  -1.6  -0.3  na  na  na  na  na 
Beef  13.7  41.2  28.8  22.0  79.6  77.0  101.3  98.5  82.6  72.8  na 
Pigmeat  -8.1  64.0  99.7  98.3  60.6  42.6  76.5  103.9  131.3  173.2  na 
Poultry  -47.5  -3.7  21.2  27.1  30.0  63.6  84.6  143.0  228.7  279.5  na 
Egg  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  26.8  23.9  17.9  24.7  na 
All covered products 
a  -21.1  7.7  6.9  19.0  15.2  38.4  82.7  116.5  136.8  166.5  na 
   Import-competing    -6.1  13.2  26.0  23.3  27.3  49.0  74.7  102.1  129.1  159.5  na 
   Exportables  -23.7  7.0  5.2  19.1  13.7  36.2  89.6  161.4  167.6  203.1  na 
Dispersion, cov    products
b  33.3  35.9  47.2  40.6  40.2  32.2  34.1  56.2  87.1  106.0  na 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of consumption where consumption is derived using the value of 
production and self-sufficiency ratios (derived from the FAOSTAT Database) as production/consumption.  
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of CTEs of covered products. 
c n.a. = data not available; n.ap. = not applicable.  




Table 6: Changes in direct tax burdens and the allocations of national government subsidies to 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, Japan, 1978 to 1937 
 
(a) Tax burdens 
  Direct tax burden
a     Direct tax rate
b  
  Agriculture     Non-agriculture     Agriculture     Non-agriculture  








  (%)     (%)  
1878-82   63.6   91     6.3   9          
1888-92   58.5   86     9.8   14     14.9     2.0  
1898-02   99.1   74     35.4   26     11.7     2.7  
1908-12   153.4   54     132.2   46     11.2     5.5  
1918-22   295.7   41     431.1   59     7.5     4.8  
1928-32   205.5   33     421.3   67     8.1     3.8  
1933-37   197.3   26     559.2   74     6.5     4.0  
 
(b) Subsidy allocations 
  Subsidy receipt
c     Subsidy rate
d  
  Agriculture     Non-agriculture     Agriculture     Non-agriculture  








  (%)     (%)  
1881   0   0     0.7   100          
1891   0   0     2.5   100     0     0.49  
1901   0.4   2     18.7   98     0.05     1.41  
1911   0.3   1     27.8   99     0.02     1.09  
1921   0.6   1     51.8   99     0.02     0.55  
1931   21.4   17     101.5   83     1.17     1.11  
1934   28.3   28     71.0   72     1.14     0.58  
 
a  Includes both national tax and local rates. 
b  Direct tax burden divided by sectoral NDP 
c  National government subsidies. 
d  Subsidy receipt divided by sectoral NDP. 
Source:  Tobata and Ohkawa (1956) for tax and subsidy data; Ohkawa and Shinohara for sectoral 




Table 7: Farm-nonfarm income disparity in Japan's economic development, 1885 to 2000 
            








    per capita  agriculture  rate of  rate  Average  labour  terms of  hold   
    (ppp at 2000)  in GDP  protection  of rice  tariff rate,  productivity  trade  income 
        for rice    all products  ratio    ratio 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
    US$    %  %  %  %  %  1885=100  % 
                   
  1885  1,092  45  15    -  -  75  100  76 
  1890  1,285  48  34    -  -  67  115  87 
  1900  1,498  39  21    -  3.7  49  102  52 
  1910  1,656  32  35    14  16.2  37  98  47 
  1920  2,154  30  16    10  10.7  50  99  48 
  1930  2,350  18  57    14  22.6  31  104  32 
  1935  2,693  18  134    41  23.8  24  136  38 
                   
  1955  3,519  21  49    -  3.5  55  163  77 
  1960  5,063  13  98    -  6.5  39  169  70 
  1970  12,337  6  150    -  6.9  25  303    94 
  1980  17,056    4  205    -  2.5  25  342    116 
  1990  23,580    2  481    -  2.7  26  379    115 
  2000  26,220    1  560    778  2.1  22    347    101 
Notes:                 
(1)  GDP per capita in PPP at 2000 from World Bank (2006), linked with the series from OECD (2003). 
(2)  The share of agriculture in nominal GDP for 1885-1935 and share in NNP for 1885-1935 are from Ohkawa and 
Shinohara (1979, pp.273-81) 1960-2000 data are from World Bank (2006). 
(3)  Nominal rates of protection for rice for 1885-1960 are calculated by the difference between the domestic wholesale 
price of rice and the unit value of imported rice as percentage of the latter. For 1970-2000, it is calculated by the 
difference between the domestic wholesale price of rice and unit value of world rice imports multiplied by 1.18, 
expressed as a percentage of the latter. Data are from Kayo (1977) and Bank of Japan, Yearbook of Wholesale Price 
Indexes, various years for domestic wholesale price of rice, and Nihon Boeki Seiran, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1935, 
Yearbook of Japan Foreign Trade Statistics, Japan Tariff Association, and FAOSTAT, FAO for border prices. 
(4)  Tariffs for 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1935 are tariffs in 1908, 1918, 1928 and 1933, respectively, from Ohkawa, 
Shinohara and Umenura (1967). Tariff rate for 2000 is ad valorem tariff equivalent of specific duty, 341 yen/kg, 
which was reported to the WTO by the Japanese government. 
(5)  Tariffs for 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1935 are tariffs in 1898, 1908, 1918, 1928 and 1933, respectively, from 
Ohkawa, Shinohara and Umenura (1967). Tariffs for 1955-2000 are average tariffs calculated by total tariff 
revenue as percentage of total import cif value in the Ministry of Finance, Monthly Report of Financial Statistics, 




(6)  The ratio of real GDP per worker in agriculture (including forestry and fishery) to real GDP per worker in industry 
(including mining). 1885-1970 from Hayami (1986, p.120). 1980-2000 values are extended from 1970 using real 
GDPs and the numbers of employed persons from Annual Reports of National Accounts. 
(7)  1985-1960: the ratio between the price index of agricultural products and the price index of manufacturing products 
in Ohkawa, Shinohara and Umenura (1967, pp.165 and192-3). 1970-80 extended from 1960 using the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery‘s price index of agricultural products and the Bank of Japan‘s domestic corporate 
goods price index for manufacturing industry products. 
(8)  1885-1935: the ratio in household income per household member between farm and non-farm households in Otsuki 
and Takamatsu (1982). 1955-2000 values are the ratio in per-capita income between farm households and 
employees‘ households based on the Ministry of Agriculture‘s Farm Household Economy Survey and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs‘ National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure. Farm households in 1990-2000 exclude 
non-commercial farm households. 




Appendix Table A1: Annual distortion estimates, Japan, 1955 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 




mber  Egg  Grape 
Mand
arin  Milk  Onion  Pear 
1955  na  26  -5  na  na  -63.5  na  na  49  na  na 
1956  na  27  44  na  na  17.9  na  na  47  na  na 
1957  na  31  43  na  na  42.6  na  na  41  na  na 
1958  na  50  38  na  na  18.2  na  na  52  na  na 
1959  na  44  18  na  na  0.0  na  na  31  na  na 
1960  na  61  44  na  na  0.0  na  na  51  na  na 
1961  na  55  65  na  na  -6  na  na  75  na  na 
1962  na  24  79  na  na  4  na  na  92  na  na 
1963  na  30  90  na  na  -9  na  na  125  na  na 
1964  na  24  63  na  na  -6  na  na  137  na  na 
1965  na  17  122  na  na  -11  na  na  112  na  na 
1966  na  5  115  na  na  -2  na  na  103  na  na 
1967  na  10  115  na  na  -2  na  na  112  na  na 
1968  na  23  136  na  na  -1  na  na  199  na  na 
1969  na  27  167  na  na  -9  na  na  284  na  na 
1970  na  38  128  na  na  -1  na  na  266  na  na 
1971  na  10  106  na  na  -9  na  na  157  na  na 
1972  na  71  112  na  na  3  na  na  92  na  na 
1973  na  -14  114  na  na  -9  na  na  167  na  na 
1974  na  -54  69  na  na  3  na  na  145  na  na 
1975  na  na  205  na  na  5  na  na  144  na  na 
1976  na  4  203  na  na  -14  na  na  337  na  na 
1977  na  43  242  na  na  -5  na  na  502  na  na 
1978  na  134  266  na  na  1  na  na  545  na  na 
1979  na  72  159  na  na  -4  na  na  400  na  na 
1980  na  44  138  na  na  -3  na  na  259  na  na 
1981  na  62  138  na  na  13  na  na  173  na  na 
1982  na  41  123  na  na  -3  na  na  146  na  na 
1983  na  155  139  na  na  -2  na  na  214  na  na 
1984  na  142  146  na  na  2  na  na  265  na  na 
1985  na  226  156  na  na  16  na  na  308  na  na 
1986  64  227  252  5  24  52  53  20  453  83  42 
1987  20  255  230  5  24  -4  55  20  494  83  23 
1988  23  181  227  25  28  16  61  23  364  27  38 
1989  20  130  179  5  154  20  180  20  206  27  38 
1990  21  94  168  6  5  19  88  21  230  30  8 
1991  20  115  164  5  17  37  64  20  268  49  28 
1992  20  134  143  5  7  6  56  26  254  33  38 
1993  39  146  183  5  44  16  81  20  290  128  8 
1994  20  220  228  135  14  38  123  137  360  165  38 
1995  27  151  183  136  24  55  121  60  295  94  83 
1996  19  72  196  79  14  27  107  88  208  83  29 
1997  19  90  200  113  32  25  86  19  205  106  16 
1998  56  129  196  162  33  6  117  52  200  207  87 
1999  18  203  184  148  45  56  158  18  281  232  106 
2000  44  154  174  193  44  63  158  42  296  222  219 
2001  57  119  206  153  50  28  155  17  185  261  199 
2002  18  125  105  166  39  22  174  25  324  302  224 
2003  17  102  98  153  42  2  196  20  305  294  61 
2004  21  108  163  223  40  23  205  57  256  342  84 
2005  17  284  40  240  47  17  203  37  119  344  76 
2006  17  258  39  187  38  17  176  85  118  286  233 




   Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Soybean  Spinach 
Strawbe
rry  Sugar  Wheat 
All 
covered 
1955  3  -40  51  na  na  na  na  34  23 
1956  -3  -41  67  na  na  na  na  31  50 
1957  2  93  77  na  na  na  na  31  63 
1958  0  59  79  na  na  na  na  42  65 
1959  87  95  88  na  na  na  na  42  68 
1960  94  99  94  na  na  na  na  44  75 
1961  89  37  87  na  na  na  na  41  64 
1962  55  13  66  na  na  na  na  36  53 
1963  28  33  102  na  na  na  na  42  69 
1964  33  31  107  na  na  na  na  33  71 
1965  23  34  127  na  na  na  na  44  77 
1966  17  27  128  na  na  na  na  40  79 
1967  0  37  118  na  na  na  na  32  75 
1968  11  45  115  na  na  na  na  43  82 
1969  10  25  126  na  na  na  na  52  86 
1970  -10  24  166  na  na  na  na  57  91 
1971  3  53  193  na  na  na  na  56  87 
1972  3  45  257  na  na  na  na  97  100 
1973  -2  38  169  na  na  na  na  -8  79 
1974  -12  24  39  na  na  na  na  -75  31 
1975  4  26  94  na  na  na  na  -85  64 
1976  -5  35  175  na  na  na  na  4  91 
1977  -7  37  229  na  na  na  na  156  116 
1978  20  40  285  na  na  na  na  212  156 
1979  4  17  271  547  na  na  107  94  127 
1980  6  22  227  391  na  na  100  66  100 
1981  18  24  225  415  na  na  224  84  105 
1982  7  12  248  533  na  na  243  93  97 
1983  13  20  303  282  na  na  258  149  120 
1984  19  6  332  433  na  na  323  167  136 
1985  -1  7  413  631  na  na  310  182  148 
1986  -5  29  645  264  103  10  215  172  168 
1987  1  21  718  205  103  10  191  198  160 
1988  7  23  637  119  147  13  159  163  157 
1989  1  7  546  78  5  10  116  136  133 
1990  -4  11  518  48  5  11  151  138  119 
1991  11  14  544  34  33  10  156  226  127 
1992  16  19  638  17  119  12  164  182  142 
1993  1  44  818  0  103  32  168  212  149 
1994  4  37  762  7  430  61  153  244  209 
1995  8  31  758  13  140  46  148  290  177 
1996  7  36  523  21  583  22  143  155  142 
1997  8  32  441  43  234  19  135  174  130 
1998  16  39  411  65  54  11  175  180  127 
1999  12  69  544  68  173  33  194  222  160 
2000  13  108  597  39  199  34  150  185  173 
2001  16  73  597  41  108  20  152  153  146 
2002  9  71  624  79  112  9  147  111  142 
2003  -11  73  629  79  134  11  175  102  128 
2004  1  45  588  98  119  9  150  92  143 
2005  94  12  521  76  91  9  152  387  129 
2006  162  12  318  109  3  6  109  358  109 




Appendix Table A1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Japan, 1955 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b 
and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 
industries           (percent) 
  NRA, all agric products,























































1955  23  2  na  17  17  na  20  20  2  17 
1956  50  5  na  34  34  na  41  41  2  39 
1957  63  6  na  43  43  na  53  53  2  50 
1958  65  6  na  49  49  na  57  57  3  52 
1959  68  7  na  52  52  na  60  60  3  55 
1960  75  8  na  55  55  na  64  64  4  59 
1961  64  6  na  47  47  na  55  55  4  50 
1962  53  5  na  36  36  na  44  44  4  38 
1963  69  7  na  47  47  na  57  57  4  51 
1964  71  6  na  44  44  na  55  55  4  48 
1965  77  7  na  49  49  na  60  60  4  54 
1966  79  8  na  48  48  na  60  60  4  54 
1967  75  7  na  45  45  na  57  57  4  51 
1968  82  8  na  54  54  na  65  65  4  59 
1969  86  9  na  56  56  na  68  68  4  62 
1970  91  10  na  57  57  na  70  70  4  65 
1971  87  9  na  54  54  na  66  66  3  61 
1972  100  10  na  59  59  na  74  74  3  69 
1973  79  8  na  45  45  na  57  57  2  53 
1974  31  3  na  19  19  na  23  23  1  22 
1975  64  7  na  39  39  na  48  75  1  73 
1976  91  10  na  54  54  na  67  67  2  64 
1977  116  13  na  72  72  na  88  88  2  84 
1978  156  17  na  89  89  na  112  112  2  108 
1979  127  14  4  79  97  na  92  96  1  93 
1980  100  12  4  63  80  na  73  76  1  75 
1981  105  12  4  68  83  na  77  81  1  79 
1982  97  11  4  65  81  na  73  77  1  75 
1983  120  14  4  77  92  na  87  92  1  90 
1984  136  16  4  88  102  na  100  104  1  102 
1985  148  17  5  96  110  na  109  114  1  111 
1986  168  27  7  137  143  na  145  152  1  149 
1987  160  23  8  131  136  na  137  145  1  142 
1988  157  25  7  124  129  na  132  139  1  136 
1989  133  26  6  106  111  na  113  119  1  117 
1990  119  15  5  90  93  na  96  101  1  99 
1991  127  19  5  95  98  na  102  107  1  105 
1992  142  21  6  112  115  na  118  124  1  121 
1993  149  29  7  112  114  na  121  128  1  125 
1994  209  50  7  172  174  na  186  192  1  189 
1995  177  43  8  140  142  na  151  159  1  156 
1996  142  39  6  116  119  na  123  130  1  127 
1997  130  34  6  106  109  na  111  118  1  116 
1998  127  46  7  105  108  na  113  119  1  118 
1999  160  49  7  131  133  na  140  147  1  145 
2000  173  55  6  141  145  na  152  159  1  157 
2001  146  50  5  119  124  na  129  134  1  132 
2002  142  49  5  115  120  na  124  129  1  128 
2003  128  46  5  103  108  na  111  115  1  114 
2004  143  53  4  123  127  na  130  134  1  133 
2005  129  0  3  88  93  na  148  151  1  150 
2006  109  31  3  75  79  na  124  127  1  126 
2007  85  24  4  60  65  na  101  104  1  103 





b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for 




Appendix Table A2.1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Japan, 1955 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 




mber  Egg  Grape 
Mand
arin  Milk  Onion  Pear 
1955  na  4  2  na  na  14  na  na  2  na  na 
1956  na  5  2  na  na  6  na  na  3  na  na 
1957  na  4  2  na  na  5  na  na  4  na  na 
1958  na  4  2  na  na  6  na  na  5  na  na 
1959  na  4  3  na  na  7  na  na  5  na  na 
1960  na  3  2  na  na  8  na  na  5  na  na 
1961  na  3  2  na  na  12  na  na  5  na  na 
1962  na  2  2  na  na  10  na  na  4  na  na 
1963  na  2  2  na  na  13  na  na  4  na  na 
1964  na  1  3  na  na  12  na  na  4  na  na 
1965  na  1  2  na  na  13  na  na  5  na  na 
1966  na  1  2  na  na  11  na  na  4  na  na 
1967  na  1  2  na  na  9  na  na  4  na  na 
1968  na  1  2  na  na  10  na  na  3  na  na 
1969  na  1  2  na  na  12  na  na  3  na  na 
1970  na  0  3  na  na  11  na  na  3  na  na 
1971  na  0  4  na  na  12  na  na  5  na  na 
1972  na  0  4  na  na  11  na  na  7  na  na 
1973  na  0  4  na  na  10  na  na  4  na  na 
1974  na  0  4  na  na  7  na  na  4  na  na 
1975  na  na  3  na  na  8  na  na  5  na  na 
1976  na  0  3  na  na  10  na  na  3  na  na 
1977  na  0  3  na  na  10  na  na  3  na  na 
1978  na  0  3  na  na  9  na  na  3  na  na 
1979  na  0  5  na  na  8  na  na  4  na  na 
1980  na  0  5  na  na  10  na  na  5  na  na 
1981  na  0  5  na  na  9  na  na  6  na  na 
1982  na  0  6  na  na  8  na  na  7  na  na 
1983  na  0  6  na  na  8  na  na  6  na  na 
1984  na  0  6  na  na  8  na  na  5  na  na 
1985  na  0  6  na  na  8  na  na  5  na  na 
1986  2  0  6  2  3  8  1  3  5  1  1 
1987  2  0  7  2  3  9  1  3  5  1  2 
1988  2  0  7  2  3  7  1  3  6  2  1 
1989  2  0  7  1  1  7  1  3  8  2  1 
1990  2  0  6  2  3  7  1  3  7  2  2 
1991  2  0  6  2  3  7  1  4  6  2  1 
1992  3  0  7  1  3  7  1  3  7  2  2 
1993  2  0  6  2  3  7  1  3  7  1  2 
1994  3  0  6  1  4  7  1  2  7  2  2 
1995  3  0  7  1  3  7  1  3  8  1  1 
1996  3  0  6  1  3  8  1  3  9  1  2 
1997  2  0  6  1  3  8  1  3  9  1  2 
1998  2  0  5  1  3  8  1  3  9  1  1 
1999  3  0  7  1  3  7  1  3  8  1  1 
2000  2  0  8  1  3  7  1  3  9  1  1 
2001  2  0  5  1  2  8  1  3  11  1  1 
2002  2  0  7  1  3  8  1  3  7  1  1 
2003  2  0  8  1  2  8  1  3  7  1  1 
2004  3  0  8  1  2  9  1  2  9  1  1 
2005  3  0  8  1  3  10  1  3  8  1  1 
2006  3  0  8  1  3  9  1  2  8  1  1 




   Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Soybean  Spinach 
Strawberr
y  Sugar  Wheat 
Non-cove
red  
1955  2  1  44  na  na  na  na  3  28 
1956  3  2  40  na  na  na  na  3  37 
1957  3  0  44  na  na  na  na  3  34 
1958  3  1  50  na  na  na  na  3  28 
1959  2  1  48  na  na  na  na  3  27 
1960  2  1  45  na  na  na  na  3  30 
1961  2  2  41  na  na  na  na  3  30 
1962  3  3  39  na  na  na  na  2  35 
1963  5  3  35  na  na  na  na  1  35 
1964  5  2  29  na  na  na  na  2  43 
1965  6  3  29  na  na  na  na  1  40 
1966  6  3  28  na  na  na  na  1  44 
1967  8  3  29  na  na  na  na  1  44 
1968  8  3  33  na  na  na  na  1  38 
1969  9  4  31  na  na  na  na  1  39 
1970  11  4  24  na  na  na  na  0  42 
1971  12  4  18  na  na  na  na  0  43 
1972  12  5  16  na  na  na  na  0  45 
1973  12  5  17  na  na  na  na  0  48 
1974  11  4  25  na  na  na  na  1  44 
1975  12  4  25  na  na  na  na  1  43 
1976  14  5  19  na  na  na  na  0  46 
1977  16  6  20  na  na  na  na  0  43 
1978  14  6  18  na  na  na  na  0  48 
1979  14  6  16  0  na  na  0  0  46 
1980  14  6  14  0  na  na  0  0  46 
1981  13  6  16  0  na  na  0  0  44 
1982  14  7  15  0  na  na  0  0  42 
1983  14  7  14  0  na  na  0  0  45 
1984  13  8  15  0  na  na  0  0  44 
1985  15  8  13  0  na  na  0  0  44 
1986  19  7  11  0  1  2  1  0  27 
1987  17  7  10  0  1  3  1  0  27 
1988  15  6  10  0  1  3  1  0  30 
1989  13  7  10  0  2  3  1  0  31 
1990  13  6  9  0  2  2  1  0  32 
1991  11  6  8  0  2  3  1  0  34 
1992  12  6  9  0  1  3  1  0  30 
1993  12  5  6  0  1  3  1  0  36 
1994  14  6  12  0  1  3  1  0  27 
1995  12  6  8  0  1  3  1  0  33 
1996  12  6  10  0  0  3  1  0  31 
1997  11  6  10  0  1  3  1  0  32 
1998  10  6  9  0  2  3  1  0  35 
1999  12  6  9  0  1  3  1  0  33 
2000  12  5  8  1  1  4  1  0  33 
2001  12  6  7  1  1  4  1  0  33 
2002  13  6  7  0  1  4  1  0  34 
2003  13  5  6  0  1  4  1  0  36 
2004  14  7  8  0  1  4  1  0  27 
2005  7  4  9  0  1  4  1  1  34 
2006  5  5  11  0  3  4  1  0  34 
2007  4  4  12  1  2  4  1  1  34 




Appendix Table A2: Annual distortion estimates, Korea, 1955 to 2007 




ey  Beef 
Cab
bage  Egg 
Garli














1955  -11  7  na  na  na  na  na  -42  -43  -42  -33  -56  -38 
1956  36  36  na  na  na  na  na  -39  -31  -6  -28  -41  -4 
1957  90  54  na  na  na  na  na  -15  -6  26  -5  -32  27 
1958  63  62  na  -16  na  na  na  29  9  -6  -11  -43  3 
1959  27  35  na  -38  na  na  na  -8  13  -12  12  -43  -7 
1960  65  53  na  -45  na  na  na  -2  6  -4  29  -41  1 
1961  19  -3  na  -50  na  na  na  -41  -33  -44  -33  -56  -36 
1962  19  21  na  -40  na  na  na  16  -13  -44  -23  -45  -32 
1963  144  61  na  -13  na  na  na  68  12  25  61  -8  36 
1964  171  40  na  25  na  na  na  67  62  32  60  16  52 
1965  61  39  na  25  na  na  na  108  81  -2  44  -19  16 
1966  43  26  na  24  na  na  na  114  81  -10  55  -15  7 
1967  68  30  na  34  na  105  na  145  134  -14  104  -10  10 
1968  85  87  na  30  na  210  na  235  203  -11  38  -6  19 
1969  105  143  na  2  na  205  na  191  158  9  53  -6  32 
1970  144  119  na  28  na  216  na  207  152  39  131  10  64 
1971  149  120  na  9  na  133  na  286  153  63  76  17  82 
1972  198  85  na  -8  na  41  na  222  80  88  102  25  95 
1973  74  18  na  -7  na  60  na  193  52  11  48  -20  23 
1974  36  28  na  -21  na  94  na  112  80  -44  43  -31  -27 
1975  59  80  na  -17  na  133  na  154  107  -4  59  -20  13 
1976  76  128  na  -14  na  187  na  189  144  48  108  -4  60 
1977  112  218  na  -11  na  189  na  169  182  65  118  53  76 
1978  131  224  na  -2  na  175  na  270  212  66  174  61  89 
1979  129  162  na  6  na  261  na  232  164  123  152  42  131 
1980  57  137  na  12  na  223  na  181  90  109  199  89  112 
1981  125  186  na  4  na  194  na  285  122  98  252  86  119 
1982  170  190  na  8  na  169  na  196  90  122  290  92  131 
1983  241  159  na  36  na  153  na  106  87  130  292  110  129 
1984  238  144  na  14  na  160  na  78  82  133  232  84  123 
1985  293  68  na  23  na  128  na  164  75  169  275  69  144 
1986  399  97  30  11  250  211  175  144  64  196  302  99  158 
1987  417  93  30  3  250  238  175  100  57  222  415  171  161 
1988  336  178  30  7  250  162  175  119  112  226  410  204  177 
1989  341  195  30  54  250  187  175  97  126  259  407  178  195 
1990  363  207  30  39  250  152  175  190  142  276  459  222  209 
1991  494  223  30  9  250  289  175  172  136  254  461  265  200 
1992  461  206  30  40  250  158  175  95  138  254  508  201  184 
1993  534  171  30  12  310  197  281  116  165  283  554  195  198 
1994  769  197  30  39  383  222  421  173  198  262  559  197  219 
1995  632  223  30  59  210  154  204  130  171  340  734  200  214 
1996  403  200  29  15  44  128  108  138  185  336  604  134  186 
1997  635  144  29  17  232  147  153  88  161  284  453  99  177 
1998  449  71  29  7  373  118  87  60  135  199  393  64  127 
1999  596  162  29  35  207  157  176  166  206  313  945  116  210 
2000  740  139  28  30  30  205  192  124  220  390  908  157  216 
2001  412  175  28  42  8  105  221  93  201  374  702  137  194 
2002  561  254  28  40  88  154  144  122  164  422  780  130  221 
2003  572  142  27  55  205  139  267  134  131  395  750  129  211 




2005  320  164  27  33  245  149  154  82  58  226  791  na  147 
2006  322  200  27  28  116  173  335  125  75  205  813  na  159 




Appendix Table A2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Korea, 1955 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries  
        (percent) 
  NRA, all agric products,























































1955  -38  -17  na  -28  -28  na  -36  -36  48  -57 
1956  -4  0  na  -2  -2  na  -2  -2  35  -28 
1957  27  10  na  17  17  na  26  26  35  -7 
1958  3  1  na  2  2  na  3  3  41  -27 
1959  -7  -3  na  -5  -5  na  -7  -7  69  -45 
1960  1  0  na  1  1  na  1  1  66  -39 
1961  -36  -17  na  -27  -27  na  -33  -33  37  -51 
1962  -32  -14  na  -23  -23  na  -29  -29  34  -47 
1963  36  13  na  27  27  na  35  35  26  7 
1964  52  17  na  42  42  na  51  51  23  23 
1965  16  6  na  13  13  na  15  15  27  -9 
1966  7  3  na  6  6  na  7  7  23  -13 
1967  10  4  na  8  8  na  9  9  23  -11 
1968  19  9  na  15  15  na  19  19  21  -2 
1969  32  13  na  25  25  na  31  31  18  11 
1970  64  22  na  48  48  na  62  62  17  38 
1971  82  26  na  61  61  na  79  79  12  60 
1972  95  27  na  72  72  na  91  91  12  71 
1973  23  9  na  18  18  na  22  22  9  12 
1974  -27  -7  na  -21  -21  na  -24  -24  8  -29 
1975  13  5  na  10  10  na  12  12  9  3 
1976  60  23  na  48  48  na  58  58  11  43 
1977  76  28  na  59  59  na  75  75  17  50 
1978  89  33  na  66  66  na  86  86  12  66 
1979  131  37  0  99  99  na  128  129  10  108 
1980  112  34  1  80  81  na  107  108  8  93 
1981  119  37  0  90  91  na  116  116  6  103 
1982  131  39  1  97  97  na  127  128  7  114 
1983  129  39  1  93  94  na  125  125  7  110 
1984  123  38  1  90  90  na  119  120  6  107 
1985  144  46  1  101  101  na  138  139  6  126 
1986  158  69  1  127  127  na  156  156  6  141 
1987  161  67  2  126  127  na  155  157  6  141 
1988  177  69  3  141  141  na  169  172  6  157 
1989  195  70  4  145  145  na  180  184  4  173 
1990  209  76  6  160  166  na  196  201  4  190 
1991  200  77  6  151  157  na  187  193  4  183 
1992  184  81  6  149  155  na  179  186  3  176 
1993  198  96  8  161  166  na  200  209  3  200 
1994  219  109  9  178  182  na  226  235  3  226 
1995  214  87  10  158  162  na  198  208  2  200 
1996  186  50  7  124  127  na  145  153  3  146 
1997  177  77  8  137  139  na  164  171  2  165 
1998  127  75  6  111  113  na  129  134  2  129 
1999  210  83  5  155  158  na  188  194  2  188 
2000  216  60  5  138  142  na  166  171  2  166 
2001  194  56  4  127  134  na  150  154  2  149 
2002  221  66  5  139  146  na  168  173  2  168 
2003  211  85  4  146  155  na  181  185  2  180 




2005  147  49  4  87  102  na  114  117  2  114 
2006  159  53  4  89  102  na  136  139  2  136 
2007  137  46  4  76  86  na  100  104  2  101 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 




Appendix Table A2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Korea, 1955 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Barley  Beef 
Cabba






y  Rice 
Soybe




1955  6  1  na  na  na  na  na  4  2  39  1  1  48 
1956  7  1  na  na  na  na  na  4  1  31  1  1  54 
1957  5  1  na  na  na  na  na  3  1  30  1  1  58 
1958  4  1  na  1  na  na  na  3  1  35  1  1  53 
1959  5  2  na  3  na  na  na  4  1  34  1  1  50 
1960  4  2  na  4  na  na  na  4  1  32  1  1  51 
1961  7  1  na  1  na  na  na  2  1  39  1  1  47 
1962  7  1  na  2  na  na  na  1  1  38  1  1  49 
1963  5  1  na  2  na  na  na  2  1  47  1  1  40 
1964  9  2  na  2  na  na  na  2  1  52  2  1  28 
1965  11  2  na  2  na  na  na  2  1  46  2  1  33 
1966  12  2  na  2  na  na  na  2  1  48  1  1  32 
1967  10  2  na  2  na  0  na  2  1  47  2  1  35 
1968  10  2  na  2  na  0  na  1  1  47  2  1  33 
1969  8  2  na  4  na  0  na  2  1  48  1  1  33 
1970  8  2  na  4  na  0  na  2  1  41  2  1  38 
1971  9  3  na  5  na  0  na  2  2  40  2  1  37 
1972  8  3  na  6  na  0  na  2  2  41  2  1  35 
1973  7  4  na  4  na  0  na  2  2  45  2  0  34 
1974  5  2  na  3  na  0  na  1  1  53  1  0  33 
1975  7  3  na  4  na  0  na  2  1  51  2  0  29 
1976  7  3  na  5  na  0  na  2  1  46  2  0  33 
1977  3  2  na  5  na  1  na  3  1  47  2  0  36 
1978  3  3  na  4  na  1  na  3  1  43  1  0  41 
1979  4  5  na  4  na  1  na  5  2  43  1  0  35 
1980  3  6  na  5  na  1  na  7  2  33  1  0  42 
1981  3  5  na  4  na  1  na  5  1  43  1  0  36 
1982  2  5  na  5  na  1  na  7  2  39  1  0  38 
1983  2  5  na  4  na  2  na  8  2  36  1  0  40 
1984  2  5  na  5  na  2  na  8  2  35  1  0  40 
1985  2  8  na  4  na  3  na  7  2  31  1  0  43 
1986  1  7  3  4  2  2  4  6  3  31  1  0  36 
1987  1  7  4  5  1  2  3  6  3  27  1  0  38 
1988  1  5  5  4  2  3  4  6  3  30  1  0  36 
1989  1  4  5  4  2  3  1  6  3  26  1  0  44 
1990  1  4  4  4  3  4  2  7  3  26  1  0  41 
1991  1  5  4  5  3  2  3  7  3  23  0  0  45 
1992  1  6  3  4  3  3  4  9  3  22  0  0  41 
1993  1  6  4  4  2  3  3  10  3  19  0  0  44 
1994  0  6  4  4  2  3  2  8  3  21  0  0  46 
1995  0  5  3  4  4  3  4  8  3  15  0  0  52 
1996  0  4  3  4  4  3  5  7  3  16  0  0  51 
1997  0  5  3  4  2  3  3  9  3  19  0  0  48 
1998  0  6  3  5  2  3  4  10  3  21  0  0  42 
1999  0  6  3  4  2  3  3  9  3  19  0  0  48 
2000  0  5  3  3  3  3  3  7  2  16  0  0  53 
2001  0  4  3  4  4  4  3  8  2  16  0  0  52 
2002  0  3  3  4  2  4  3  8  3  13  0  0  56 
2003  0  5  4  4  1  4  2  9  3  14  0  0  55 




2005  0  7  2  5  1  4  2  12  4  18  0  na  43 
2006  0  7  3  5  1  4  1  10  4  19  0  na  46 
2007  0  7  3  4  3  5  2  8  4  17  0  na  47 




Appendix Table A2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Korea, 1955 to 2007 
(d) Trade status
a of covered




y  Beef 
Cabb
age  Egg 
Garli
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M  M  M  M  M 
1971  M  M  na 
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M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1972  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1973  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1974  M  M  na 
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M  M  M  M  M 
1975  M  M  na 
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M  M  M  M  M 
1976  M  M  na 
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M  M  M  M  M 
1977  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1978  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1979  M  M  na 
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M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1980  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1981  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
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M  M  M  M  M 
1982  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1983  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1984  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1985  M  M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  na 
 
M  M  M  M  M 
1986  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1987  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1988  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1989  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1990  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1991  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1992  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1993  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1994  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1995  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1996  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1997  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1998  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
1999  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
2000  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
2001  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
2002  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
2003  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 
2004  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M 




2006  M  M  H  M  M  M  H  M  M  H  M  M 
2007  M  M  H  M  M  M  H  M  M  H  M  M 
a Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 





Appendix Table A3: Annual distortion estimates, Taiwan, 1955 to 2002 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  (percent) 
   Beef  Egg  Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Wheat  All  
1955  -23  0  -39  -68  -49  96  -47 
1956  52  0  10  -37  -11  31  -6 
1957  47  0  9  -30  -3  38  1 
1958  -10  0  -20  -55  -48  53  -41 
1959  3  0  -1  -46  -37  23  -25 
1960  20  0  14  -34  -9  31  -3 
1961  49  0  24  -14  3  34  8 
1962  48  0  73  2  -13  32  2 
1963  51  0  120  4  -7  41  16 
1964  39  0  88  25  -7  42  13 
1965  66  0  118  20  -8  43  16 
1966  51  0  112  14  -14  30  11 
1967  4  0  87  18  -21  36  2 
1968  0  0  113  31  -24  43  2 
1969  24  0  69  23  -21  45  1 
1970  14  0  82  19  0  55  21 
1971  29  0  109  29  0  39  31 
1972  50  0  114  39  2  65  35 
1973  -4  0  111  27  -24  8  16 
1974  22  0  74  22  -25  -6  0 
1975  105  0  125  22  -15  0  15 
1976  73  0  57  20  3  29  20 
1977  89  0  45  42  -10  84  13 
1978  91  0  49  35  -19  90  9 
1979  41  0  28  31  3  83  15 
1980  54  0  46  39  17  81  29 
1981  72  0  48  65  8  81  27 
1982  75  0  44  63  29  115  37 
1983  88  1  41  85  46  na  46 
1984  96  2  33  66  63  na  47 
1985  95  9  41  57  73  na  53 
1986  104  19  56  70  84  na  64 
1987  108  17  72  87  110  na  81 
1988  102  27  90  98  108  na  93 
1989  97  61  123  110  142  na  122 
1990  97  9  112  107  146  na  112 
1991  97  -1  76  112  144  na  93 
1992  95  41  93  149  170  na  115 
1993  99  30  100  168  191  na  126 
1994  106  40  138  178  156  na  140 
1995  66  33  108  167  208  na  131 
1996  97  2  124  167  174  na  126 
1997  101  -1  94  195  149  na  114 
1998  85  11  108  242  134  na  128 
1999  63  44  221  372  174  na  212 
2000  44  33  201  347  189  na  202 
2001  95  22  168  254  195  na  169 





Appendix Table A3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Taiwan, 1955 to 2002  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries   
      (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-agric 
tradables 








NPS)  Exportables 
Import- 
competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1955  0  -47  0  -22  -35  -7  -30  7  -35 
1956  0  -6  0  -3  -4  -3  -4  8  -11 
1957  0  1  0  0  1  -2  0  8  -7 
1958  0  -41  0  -20  -31  -3  -27  10  -33 
1959  0  -25  0  -14  -21  -3  -18  10  -26 
1960  0  -3  0  -1  -2  -1  -2  9  -10 
1961  0  8  0  4  7  -1  5  9  -3 
1962  0  2  0  1  1  1  1  10  -8 
1963  0  16  0  8  13  1  11  9  1 
1964  0  13  0  6  10  2  8  9  -1 
1965  0  16  0  7  12  2  10  9  0 
1966  0  11  0  5  8  2  7  10  -2 
1967  0  2  0  1  1  2  1  8  -7 
1968  0  2  0  1  1  3  1  9  -7 
1969  0  1  0  1  0  3  1  8  -7 
1970  0  21  0  10  16  2  13  8  5 
1971  0  31  0  14  23  3  18  7  10 
1972  0  35  0  16  26  5  20  8  11 
1973  0  16  0  7  12  3  9  8  1 
1974  0  0  0  0  -1  3  0  7  -6 
1975  0  15  0  7  12  3  9  7  2 
1976  0  20  0  10  16  4  13  7  6 
1977  0  13  0  7  9  8  8  7  1 
1978  0  9  0  4  5  6  5  7  -2 
1979  0  15  0  7  10  5  9  7  2 
1980  0  29  0  12  21  6  15  5  9 
1981  0  27  0  11  17  9  14  5  8 
1982  0  37  0  14  25  8  19  5  13 
1983  0  46  0  19  31  12  23  5  17 
1984  0  47  0  19  33  10  23  5  17 
1985  0  53  0  20  37  9  25  5  19 
1986  0  64  0  23  44  11  29  5  23 
1987  0  81  0  26  53  13  33  5  27 
1988  0  93  0  28  58  13  35  4  30 
1989  0  122  0  38  53  45  47  4  41 
1990  0  112  0  41  60  45  50  4  45 
1991  0  93  0  34  57  34  41  3  37 
1992  0  115  0  37  56  40  45  2  41 
1993  0  126  0  38  61  41  46  2  43 
1994  0  140  0  41  51  50  50  2  47 
1995  0  131  0  39  60  43  47  2  45 
1996  0  126  0  42  55  48  50  2  47 
1997  0  114  0  43  58  48  50  2  48 
1998  0  128  0  45  51  54  53  2  50 
1999  0  212  0  63  61  79  74  2  72 
2000  0  202  0  69  70  83  80  1  78 
2001  0  169  0  60  66  70  69  1  67 
2002  0  164  0  55  75  60  63  1  62 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 









t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 




Appendix Table A3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Taiwan, 1955 to 2002  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Beef  Egg  Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Wheat  Non-covered  
1955  0  0  12  1  34  0  52 
1956  0  0  15  1  40  0  43 
1957  0  0  16  1  35  0  48 
1958  0  0  12  1  36  0  50 
1959  0  1  17  1  37  0  43 
1960  0  1  13  1  33  0  53 
1961  0  1  13  2  35  0  49 
1962  0  1  8  1  40  0  49 
1963  0  1  9  2  38  0  50 
1964  0  1  9  1  35  0  54 
1965  0  1  9  1  36  0  53 
1966  0  1  9  1  37  0  52 
1967  0  1  10  2  37  0  51 
1968  0  1  9  1  39  0  50 
1969  0  1  11  2  35  0  50 
1970  0  1  12  2  32  0  53 
1971  0  1  12  2  29  0  55 
1972  0  2  12  3  28  0  55 
1973  0  1  12  3  29  0  54 
1974  0  1  12  2  38  0  46 
1975  0  2  10  2  36  0  50 
1976  0  2  15  3  31  0  49 
1977  0  2  17  4  26  0  51 
1978  0  3  16  4  26  0  52 
1979  0  2  18  4  22  0  54 
1980  0  2  14  4  21  0  58 
1981  0  2  14  4  21  0  59 
1982  0  2  15  4  18  0  61 
1983  0  3  16  5  17  0  59 
1984  0  3  16  5  15  0  60 
1985  0  3  16  5  14  0  62 
1986  0  3  17  5  11  0  64 
1987  0  2  16  5  9  0  68 
1988  0  2  14  5  10  0  69 
1989  0  2  14  6  9  0  69 
1990  0  3  17  6  10  0  63 
1991  0  3  19  5  9  0  64 
1992  0  3  17  5  7  0  68 
1993  0  3  15  5  7  0  70 
1994  0  3  14  5  7  0  70 
1995  0  3  16  5  6  0  70 
1996  0  4  17  6  7  0  67 
1997  0  5  17  7  8  0  62 
1998  0  5  14  7  8  0  65 
1999  0  5  11  6  8  0  70 
2000  0  5  14  7  8  0  66 
2001  0  5  16  7  7  0  64 
2002  0  5  14  7  7  0  67 
a At undistorted farmgate prices 




Appendix Table A4: Consumer tax equivalents for covered agricultural products, Japan, 1955 to 
2007   
(percent) 
   Apple  Barley  Beef  Cabbage  Cucumber  Egg  Grape  Mandarin  Milk  Onion 
1955  na  27  -5  na  na  -64  na  na  49  na 
1956  na  27  44  na  na  18  na  na  47  na 
1957  na  30  43  na  na  43  na  na  41  na 
1958  na  49  38  na  na  18  na  na  52  na 
1959  na  42  18  na  na  0  na  na  31  na 
1960  na  57  44  na  na  0  na  na  51  na 
1961  na  47  65  na  na  -6  na  na  75  na 
1962  na  19  79  na  na  4  na  na  92  na 
1963  na  23  90  na  na  -9  na  na  125  na 
1964  na  18  63  na  na  -6  na  na  137  na 
1965  na  12  122  na  na  -11  na  na  112  na 
1966  na  3  115  na  na  -2  na  na  103  na 
1967  na  6  115  na  na  -2  na  na  112  na 
1968  na  14  136  na  na  -1  na  na  199  na 
1969  na  15  167  na  na  -9  na  na  284  na 
1970  na  20  128  na  na  -1  na  na  266  na 
1971  na  5  106  na  na  -9  na  na  157  na 
1972  na  34  112  na  na  3  na  na  92  na 
1973  na  -7  114  na  na  -9  na  na  167  na 
1974  na  -23  69  na  na  3  na  na  145  na 
1975  na  na  205  na  na  5  na  na  144  na 
1976  na  1  203  na  na  -14  na  na  337  na 
1977  na  14  242  na  na  -5  na  na  502  na 
1978  na  42  266  na  na  1  na  na  545  na 
1979  na  24  159  na  na  -4  na  na  400  na 
1980  na  14  138  na  na  -3  na  na  259  na 
1981  na  21  138  na  na  13  na  na  173  na 
1982  na  14  123  na  na  -3  na  na  146  na 
1983  na  51  139  na  na  -2  na  na  214  na 
1984  na  46  146  na  na  2  na  na  265  na 
1985  na  74  156  na  na  16  na  na  308  na 
1986  63  186  252  5  23  51  52  20  453  83 
1987  20  225  230  5  23  -4  54  20  494  83 
1988  20  178  227  22  26  16  56  20  364  24 
1989  20  128  179  5  153  20  179  20  206  27 
1990  20  90  168  5  5  19  87  20  230  29 
1991  20  107  164  5  17  37  64  20  268  48 
1992  20  124  143  5  7  6  56  26  254  32 
1993  39  134  183  5  44  15  80  20  290  128 
1994  20  205  228  134  14  37  122  137  360  164 
1995  27  153  183  135  24  54  120  59  295  93 
1996  19  70  196  78  14  27  106  88  208  83 
1997  19  83  200  112  32  25  86  19  205  106 
1998  55  110  196  161  33  6  116  51  200  206 
1999  18  178  184  148  45  56  158  18  281  232 
2000  44  135  174  192  44  62  157  42  296  222 
2001  56  103  206  153  50  27  154  17  185  260 
2002  17  111  105  165  39  22  172  25  324  300 
2003  17  88  98  152  42  2  195  20  305  292 
2004  21  93  163  222  40  23  203  56  256  341 




2006  17  83  39  186  37  17  175  84  110  285 





Appendix Table A4 (continued) 
   Pear  Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Soybean  Spinach  Strawb.  Sugar  Wheat  Total  
1955  na  3  -40  49  na  na  na  na  35  24 
1956  na  -3  -41  65  na  na  na  na  32  48 
1957  na  2  93  76  na  na  na  na  30  59 
1958  na  0  59  83  na  na  na  na  41  65 
1959  na  87  95  93  na  na  na  na  41  69 
1960  na  94  99  98  na  na  na  na  42  75 
1961  na  89  37  85  na  na  na  na  35  62 
1962  na  55  13  66  na  na  na  na  29  52 
1963  na  28  33  93  na  na  na  na  33  63 
1964  na  33  31  85  na  na  na  na  25  59 
1965  na  23  34  109  na  na  na  na  32  67 
1966  na  17  27  109  na  na  na  na  27  67 
1967  na  0  37  91  na  na  na  na  21  58 
1968  na  11  45  97  na  na  na  na  26  67 
1969  na  10  25  115  na  na  na  na  31  74 
1970  na  -10  24  150  na  na  na  na  32  81 
1971  na  3  53  168  na  na  na  na  30  82 
1972  na  3  45  211  na  na  na  na  48  90 
1973  na  -2  38  128  na  na  na  na  -5  63 
1974  na  -12  24  29  na  na  na  na  -35  22 
1975  na  4  26  73  na  na  na  na  -27  50 
1976  na  -5  35  142  na  na  na  na  2  74 
1977  na  -7  37  197  na  na  na  na  54  98 
1978  na  20  40  244  na  na  na  na  71  135 
1979  na  4  17  242  0  na  na  59  34  109 
1980  na  6  22  205  0  na  na  56  22  92 
1981  na  18  24  191  0  na  na  118  28  92 
1982  na  7  12  215  0  na  na  145  30  86 
1983  na  13  20  264  0  na  na  204  50  108 
1984  na  19  6  289  0  na  na  312  56  115 
1985  na  -1  7  359  0  na  na  276  61  126 
1986  42  -5  29  590  0  103  10  205  155  146 
1987  23  1  21  683  0  103  10  183  209  146 
1988  38  7  23  600  0  147  10  153  161  141 
1989  38  1  7  510  0  5  10  113  95  116 
1990  8  -4  11  481  0  5  10  148  101  103 
1991  28  11  14  504  0  33  10  152  136  112 
1992  38  16  19  597  0  119  12  161  98  111 
1993  8  1  44  754  0  103  32  164  103  124 
1994  38  4  37  729  0  430  60  149  103  147 
1995  83  8  31  717  0  140  46  145  97  129 
1996  29  7  36  501  0  583  22  139  43  105 
1997  16  8  32  410  0  234  19  131  60  107 
1998  87  16  39  389  0  54  11  172  68  112 
1999  106  12  69  514  0  173  33  190  98  128 
2000  219  13  108  560  0  199  34  149  103  124 
2001  199  16  73  559  0  108  20  150  68  110 
2002  224  9  71  587  0  112  9  144  60  100 
2003  61  -11  73  601  0  134  10  170  60  91 
2004  84  1  45  565  0  119  9  145  52  107 
2005  0  94  12  501  0  91  9  142  207  100 
2006  233  162  12  303  0  3  6  136  13  82 




Appendix Table A5: Consumer tax equivalents for covered agricultural products, Korea, 1955 to 
2007   (percent) 
  
Barle
y  Beef 
Cabb
age  Egg 
Garli














1955  -12  7  na  na  na  na  na  -42  -43  -39  -40  -62  -37 
1956  37  36  na  na  na  na  na  -39  -31  -6  -36  -44  -6 
1957  90  54  na  na  na  na  na  -15  -6  23  -11  -36  23 
1958  63  62  na  -16  na  na  na  29  9  -6  -18  -47  2 
1959  26  35  na  -38  na  na  na  -8  13  -11  6  -42  -7 
1960  62  53  na  -45  na  na  na  -2  6  -4  25  -32  1 
1961  18  -3  na  -50  na  na  na  -41  -33  -39  -41  -53  -31 
1962  18  21  na  -40  na  na  na  16  -13  -39  -31  -36  -28 
1963  133  61  na  -13  na  na  na  68  12  24  35  -5  33 
1964  158  40  na  25  na  na  na  67  62  31  53  14  51 
1965  56  39  na  25  na  na  na  108  81  -2  37  -18  15 
1966  41  26  na  24  na  na  na  114  81  -9  50  -17  8 
1967  63  30  na  34  na  105  na  145  134  -13  97  -9  8 
1968  77  87  na  30  na  210  na  235  203  -10  24  -5  15 
1969  88  143  na  2  na  205  na  191  158  8  50  -6  28 
1970  122  119  na  28  na  216  na  207  152  32  120  9  51 
1971  134  120  na  9  na  133  na  286  153  53  65  13  67 
1972  153  85  na  -8  na  41  na  222  80  81  90  23  81 
1973  51  18  na  -7  na  60  na  193  52  9  25  -13  16 
1974  23  28  na  -21  na  94  na  112  80  -29  16  -25  -16 
1975  37  80  na  -17  na  133  na  154  107  -3  38  -15  9 
1976  50  128  na  -14  na  187  na  189  144  44  89  -2  48 
1977  65  218  na  -11  na  189  na  169  182  59  87  32  67 
1978  72  224  na  -2  na  175  na  270  212  58  146  38  80 
1979  63  162  na  6  na  261  na  232  164  115  116  29  115 
1980  24  137  na  12  na  223  na  181  90  97  173  43  96 
1981  72  186  na  4  na  194  na  285  122  97  246  47  113 
1982  109  190  na  8  na  169  na  196  90  119  301  44  126 
1983  192  159  na  36  na  153  na  106  87  126  295  52  124 
1984  201  144  na  14  na  160  na  78  82  127  212  45  113 
1985  246  68  na  23  na  128  na  164  75  157  252  44  128 
1986  322  92  30  11  250  211  175  144  64  195  56  80  133 
1987  381  84  30  3  250  238  175  100  57  222  77  157  146 
1988  336  174  30  7  250  162  175  119  112  226  83  204  163 
1989  343  193  30  54  250  187  175  97  126  257  92  179  174 
1990  342  207  30  39  250  152  175  190  142  274  96  209  190 
1991  380  223  30  9  250  289  175  172  136  254  51  204  179 
1992  397  206  30  40  250  158  175  95  138  252  68  173  166 
1993  409  171  30  12  310  197  281  116  165  276  87  150  173 
1994  529  197  30  39  383  222  421  173  198  253  75  102  174 
1995  435  222  30  59  210  154  204  130  171  329  87  138  182 
1996  305  199  29  15  44  128  108  138  185  333  67  101  154 
1997  302  130  29  17  232  147  153  88  161  282  42  47  130 
1998  254  55  29  7  373  118  87  60  135  198  40  36  96 
1999  411  162  29  35  207  157  176  166  206  312  83  80  162 
2000  364  139  28  30  30  205  192  124  220  389  79  77  162 
2001  312  175  28  42  8  105  221  93  201  372  73  104  154 
2002  362  254  28  40  88  154  144  122  164  420  67  84  168 
2003  301  142  27  55  205  139  267  134  131  395  57  68  148 




2005  217  164  27  33  245  149  154  82  58  226  113  na  135 
2006  167  200  27  28  116  173  335  125  75  205  110  na  147 
2007  139  183  27  35  23  89  218  102  34  210  52  na  123 




Appendix Table A6: Consumer tax equivalents for covered agricultural products, Taiwan, 1955 
to 2002 
(percent) 
   Beef  Egg  Pigmeat  Poultry  Rice  Wheat  All covered  
1955  -23  0  -39  -68  -49  na  -47 
1956  52  0  10  -37  -11  37  -3 
1957  47  0  9  -30  -3  na  0 
1958  -10  0  -20  -55  -48  46  -35 
1959  3  0  -1  -46  -37  32  -21 
1960  20  0  14  -34  -9  36  0 
1961  49  0  24  -14  3  25  9 
1962  48  0  73  2  -13  20  3 
1963  51  0  120  4  -7  21  16 
1964  39  0  88  25  -7  -20  11 
1965  66  0  118  20  -8  27  16 
1966  51  0  112  14  -14  27  12 
1967  4  0  87  18  -21  29  3 
1968  0  0  113  31  -24  31  3 
1969  24  0  69  23  -21  34  2 
1970  14  0  82  19  0  34  21 
1971  29  0  109  29  0  31  29 
1972  50  0  114  39  2  35  33 
1973  -4  0  111  27  -24  3  13 
1974  22  0  74  22  -25  -30  -2 
1975  105  0  125  22  -15  -4  14 
1976  73  0  57  20  3  0  21 
1977  89  0  45  42  -10  2  16 
1978  91  0  49  35  -19  -6  10 
1979  41  0  28  31  3  0  15 
1980  54  0  46  39  17  6  29 
1981  72  0  48  65  8  -3  28 
1982  75  0  44  63  29  -4  37 
1983  88  1  41  85  46  na  49 
1984  96  2  33  66  63  na  49 
1985  95  9  41  57  73  na  53 
1986  104  19  56  70  84  na  66 
1987  108  17  72  87  110  na  82 
1988  102  27  90  98  108  na  93 
1989  97  61  123  110  142  na  120 
1990  97  9  112  107  146  na  110 
1991  97  -1  76  112  144  na  94 
1992  95  41  93  149  170  na  116 
1993  99  30  100  168  191  na  125 
1994  106  40  138  178  156  na  137 
1995  66  33  108  167  208  na  127 
1996  97  2  124  167  174  na  125 
1997  101  -1  94  195  149  na  112 
1998  85  11  108  242  134  na  124 
1999  63  44  221  372  174  na  196 
2000  44  33  201  347  189  na  184 
2001  95  22  168  254  195  na  163 
2002  79  19  150  237  226  na  153 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on authors‘ spreadsheet  
 